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THE INTEGRATION OF LAW AND FACT
IN AN UNCHARTED PARALLEL
PROCEDURAL UNIVERSE
Stephen N. Subrin*
Thomas 0. Maint
PREFACE'
I heard about David Shapiro a very long time ago. My older
brother, Bert, and David were classmates at Harvard College and
Harvard Law School. Somewhere along the way I heard that David
was an outstanding student in both of Bert's classes; I later heard-
and observed-that David was among the most accomplished and
thoughtful professors at Harvard Law School. When David, as a Dep-
uty Solicitor General, later argued one of my brother's cases before
the Supreme Court of the United States, 2 I discovered, as did so many
others, that David ranks as one of the great appellate advocates in our
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. Steve thanks Melissa
Potvin for her excellent research assistance.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law.
Thom thanks Craig Carnes, Ben Palmer, and Annie Smith for their excellent research
assistance.
We also thank Steve Burbank and Bert Subrin for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article. And we are grateful to the many lawyers we interviewed,
several of whom are thanked separately at infra notes 12-13. Mistakes, of course,
should be credited only to us.
1 Written by Steve Subrin.
2 My brother had been head of the Office of Representation Appeals at the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. He utilized a section of the National Labor Relations
Act that gives the Board rulemaking authority. The Board's rule with respect to unit
determinations for acute care hospitals was unanimously upheld in a case David ar-
gued before the Supreme Court. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606,
619-20 (1991). One seeking to learn how best to make appellate arguments might
wish to read David's argument in this case, and then note how frequently the Su-
preme Court opinion tracks his persuasive arguments and answers to questions.
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country. That he could talk a majority of the Court into the Finley
decision still astonishes me.
What an honor to be asked by Jay Tidmarsh to contribute to a
volume dedicated to David. Of course, I instantly agreed. But, as a
younger brother, I learned early on to seek help when necessary. I
thought that by asking Thorn Main, my former student, to write the
Article with me, I could accomplish two goals at once: first, I would
receive the assistance I needed, and second, I could, in some small
measure, try to carry on David's tradition of participating in the ca-
reers of younger scholars.
Some younger brothers also learn not to confront their elders on
their strongest ground. By no means would we dare to confront David
with the type of article he would write. David is apt to narrow his topic
so that he can thoroughly explore it, and back up his conclusions with
extensive evidence, carefully constructed arguments, refuted counter
propositions, and meticulously culled citations. In his article about
Rule 16, he explained that his "inclination, when confronted with a
cosmic question, is to try to particularize it by looking at an important.
instance of the problem-to see whether light from one corner can
help illuminate the whole room."'4 Thorn and I have wanted to write
about a topic that has recently perplexed us, but about which there is
very little exploration, or even recognition, in the legal literature,
whether statutes and rules, judicial opinions, law review articles, or
empirical studies. We find ourselves suspecting that something im-
portant has developed. And, in stark contrast to David's approach, we
gaze into a dark room, with only a dim flashlight, and try to infer the
presence of an elephant, or at least a squirrel.
Few law professors have been as able as David Shapiro to combine
the conceptual and practical aspects of the world of law. He will, we
hope, appreciate our effort to discern what lawyers are actually doing
in the world of civil procedure, which he has so effectively studied and
taught. Moreover, David's generosity of spirit is likely to be as be-
mused and forgiving as critical. And perhaps we will have provided
him with a slightly different procedural world to explore in the fifth
decade of his notable journey as one of the truly remarkable Ameri-
can lawyers and law professors.
3 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)
(overruling the principal holding of Finley). See generally David L. Shapiro, Supplemen-
tal Jurisdiction: A Confession, an Avoidance, and a Proposal, 74 IND. L.J. 211 (1998) (at-
tempting to explain the remarkable result in Finley and recounting the unexpected
results of the Court's decision). But I remain astonished.
4 David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking,
137 U. PA. L. RExV. 1969, 1969 (1989).
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INTRODUCTION
In this Article we suggest that there are two distinct yet related
systems that simultaneously process civil litigation. One of these is the
formal system of procedural rules and doctrine that govern pleadings
and motion practice in state or federal courts. The other system has
no procedural rulebook, is largely ignored in law schools, and is sel-
dom mentioned by judges. Yet it is a methodical and logical system
that civil litigators are aware of and, increasingly, rely upon as a neces-
sary complement to the formal system. This dichotomy poses an inter-
esting challenge for federal practice and procedure in the new
century.
Our focus is on the universe of correspondence and other materi-
als that flow between adversaries but seldom appear in the pleadings,
motions, or other papers contemplated, ordered or even received by
any formal procedural system. We have observed that many civil liti-
gators, particularly those representing plaintiffs, seem to find it both
desirable and necessary (in order to achieve optimum results for their
clients) to prepare various written documents, notebooks, and even
videos containing narratives that integrate the law and facts of their
cases in ways that may persuade their relevant audiences-the oppos-
ing lawyer, the opposing lawyer's client, their own client, insurance
companies, and mediators. These advocacy materials appear in myr-
iad forms, including demand letters, 5 other settlement correspon-
dence, 6 notebooks, 7 mediation statements, 8 edifying brochures, 9 and
documentary videos. 10 Depending on the context, we refer to this
genre at various times as "advocacy materials," "integrated advocacy
statements," and "integrated law/fact documents." Although we rec-
5 We are not referring to pro forma demand letters that might be issued pursu-
ant to negotiable instruments, demands for arbitration, or demands by shareholders
for an accounting. See infra notes 97-103, 107 and accompanying text.
6 We understand that attorneys will often send a second-and more evolved-
demand letter at a later stage in the case. This category of other (settlement) corre-
spondence may also include a defendant's written response to a demand letter. See
infra text accompanying note 105.
7 We are referring here to binder(s) of several documents, such as an integrated
law/fact narrative, proof of damage information, expert reports, potential exhibits,
and the like. See infra notes 107, 112-13 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
9 See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. These would also include the
day-in-the-life videos that are more often associated with trial testimony. Such videos
"show a plaintiffs struggle with daily activities, such as dressing, bathing, eating, and
therapy." VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 178
(2d ed. 1999).
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ognize that pleadings, motions and other papers filed with courts may
occasionally contain integrated narratives of law and fact, we were in-
trigued because the procedural rules of the formal system seldom re-
quire it. And although we recognize that lawyers have long used
demand letters, trial notebooks shared with opposing counsel, and
other such devices, we were impressed by the increasing complexity,
diversity, popularity and significance of these advocacy materials in
contemporary practice.
What evidence do we have this phenomenon is happening? We
have drawn upon our own experience." We have formally inter-
viewed over a dozen litigators.' 2 We have also drawn considerably
upon the knowledge of our friends and former students who are prac-
ticing lawyers.1 3 We have picked up a few clues in the literature-
particularly in articles and books that are targeted to the practicing
bar.1 4 We have also concluded that our observation is consistent with
what one might expect to find upon consideration of current proce-
dural rules when compared with previous procedural regimes. 15
This Article is both descriptive and normative. We describe what
we have learned about the parallel procedural universe; we also sug-
gest that if this phenomenon of lawyer utilization of non-rule pre-
scribed advocacy materials is in fact taking place and growing, as we
surmise, it is a positive development in civil litigation. In Part I, we
examine the integration of law and fact in the context of formal pro-
cedural systems. In Part II, we offer examples of integrated advocacy
statements from the parallel procedural universe, and explore why
and how we think that universe is developing. And finally, in Part III,
we ponder some of the implications and repercussions of this ex-
panding parallel universe.
11 Steve was a trial lawyer and partner at Burns & Levinson in Boston. Thorn
practiced in the trial department at Hill & Barlow, also in Boston. Both of us have
consulted on various litigation matters since joining academia.
12 In particular, we wish to thank California attorneys Louis Anapolsky, Holly
Harman, Thomas Knox, Hayne Moyer, Michele Riemer, Mark Storm, Charles
Tweedy, and in Massachusetts, Ed Barshak (and many others in the firm of Sugarman,
Rogers, Barshak & Cohen), LoriJodoin, Natasha Lisman, Burt Nadler,Jeff Petrucelly,
and Jeff Stern. These lawyers and other attorneys in their respective firms offered
thoughtful insights and contributions to this Article.
13 For example, Steve spoke at length with his former partner, Erik Lund, at Pos-
ternak, Blankstein & Lund, Boston, and his former student, Matt Belanger of Faraci &
Lange, Rochester, N.Y. Thom spoke with his former colleague, Bruce Falby, at Piper
Rudnick, Boston, and his former student, Darrin Marx, of Hughes Hubbard, Los
Angeles.
14 See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 23-73 and accompanying text.
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I. THE FORMAL PROCEDURAL UNIVERSE
For centuries in England and the United States, the process of
civil litigation has assumed four principal functions. These have taken
many forms over time and have worn many labels but, in honor of
David, we identify them as: diagnosis, declaration, discovery, and dis-
position. The last three of these four are likely obvious: parties to
formal litigation typically must declare some law and facts to initiate or
to defend a lawsuit; the litigation process typically includes some form
of discovery of information whether by investigation, informal ex-
change of information, or more formal means; and the disposition of
cases may be effected upon agreement of the parties or as part of a
formal proceeding before the court. The diagnosis function, however,
is more subtle.
Central to our thesis here is the question when and how, in civil
litigation, lawyers apply the law to the facts and how they communi-
cate their application to their opponents. A foundational principle of
virtually any legal system is to provide substantive rules that, with vary-
ing degrees of definiteness, prescribe the legal consequence of certain
conduct. 16 Facts trigger legal consequences: if B intentionally strikes
A, absent consent, the law declares it a battery; if proven, A can re-
cover damages. At some point or other in the litigation process, a
diagnostic exercise must occur whereby the law and the facts are mean-
ingfully integrated into a provable narrative.
As demonstrated in legal as well as other contexts, humans at-
tempt to understand reality by identifying some of the many variables
in a given situation and then weaving them into a comprehensible
story. 17 The eminent psychologist, educator, and researcher Jerome
Bruner suggests that the narrative "gives shape to things in the real
16 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971):
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fun-
damental than its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the
various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to govern their af-
fairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly, predictable man-
ner. Without such a "legal system," social organization and cohesion are
virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized resolution of con-
flicts individuals are capable of interdependent action that enables them to
strive for achievements without the anxieties that would beset them in a dis-
organized society.
17 Law school exam answers offer an interesting example of this exercise. Stu-
dents are graded on their ability to reassemble the facts without distorting or destroy-
ing them, and then distinguish or analogize the law in order to make an intelligent
integration. See generally Adam G. Todd, Exam Writing as Legal Writing: Teaching and
Critiquing Law School Examination Discourse, 76 TEMP. L. Rrv. 69 (2003) (advocating the
teaching, studying, and critiquing of law school exam writing).
2004] 1985
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world and often bestows on them a title to reality."' 8 James Boyd
White, a father of the American Law and Literature Movement, differ-
entiates between "discordant modes of thought and expression, these
incompatible, uncommunicating sides of oneself'-"the mind that
tells a story" and "the mind that gives reasons." 19 White proposes that
it is central to the lawyer's craft to master "both sorts of discourse
(both narrative and analysis) and put them to work, at the same time
and despite their inconsistencies, in the service of a larger
enterprise. 20
David Berg, a trial lawyer, puts it more directly in telling about
advocacy before juries: "As plaintiffs, we tell a story. As defendants, we
destroy that story and, if possible, tell a more plausible one of our
own.... Our job is to persuade. Simplifying the story, telling it with
absolute clarity of thought, is the key to convincing jurors of
anything."21
Still more succinct: "The best story wins." Such was the guidance
attributed to John Quincy Adams in a line in the movie, Amistad.22
For most lawyers the diagnostic exercise occurs instinctively as
they hear their client's story. Internal memoranda and conversations
and correspondence with the client reflect this mindset from the out-
set of a case. Indeed, in the competitive market for legal services, an
integrated narrative of the case is often prepared for the benefit of a
putative client as part of the effort to obtain the client's business.
And, of course, diagnosis is important to lawyers when drafting plead-
ings, conducting discovery, arguing motions and, ultimately, trying
18 JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 8 (2002); see also MER-
LIN DONALD, ORIGINS OF THE MODERN MIND: THREE STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF CUL-
TURE AND COGNITION 256-58 (1991) (describing the evolution of human cognition as
a transition from pre-linguistic ritualistic cultures to mythic cultures involving stories
and symbols to finally the modem use of reading, writing, and external memory such
as computer technology); VICTOR TURNER, FROM RITUAL TO THEATER: THE HUMAN
SERIOUSNESS OF PLAY 18 (1982) (discussing the role of drama as a means for the "inter-
cultural transmission of painfully achieved modalities of experience").
19 JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 859 (1973), cited in Shulamit Al-
mog, From Sterne to Borges to Lost Storytellers: Cyberspace, Narrative, and Law, 13 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 1, 5 (2002).
20 Id. at 859.
21 David Berg, The Trial Lawyer, LITIGATION, Spring 2000, at 6, 7.
22 AMISTAD (Universal Studios 1997) ("In the courtroom, whoever tells the best
story wins."), quoted in Clark D. Cunningham, But What is Their Story?, 52 EMORY LJ.
1147, 1151 (2003); see also Lee L. Bennett, Defense Community Issues: New Liabilities and
How to Respond to the Plaintiffs' Bar, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 273, 280 (2002) ("One of the
basic rules of litigation is: 'Whoever tells the best story wins.' And the ability to sim-
plify a mass of evidence and weave it into a coherent storyline cannot be
underestimated.").
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cases. Yet the documents exchanged and filed in our formal litigation
system do not necessarily contain a meaningful diagnosis; rare is the
pleading, motion, or other paper with a fully integrated narrative of
law and fact about the case. This anomaly is a relatively recent
phenomenon.
We review these four functions of process, first, within the con-
text of the historical foundations of the common law. In the early
English system, writs declared the underlying essential facts. The
name of the writ identified the type of story, the legal consequence,
and the procedure to be followed. 23 Discovery, in the early years, oc-
curred informally, by asking the clients and neighbors what hap-
pened; indeed, so far as we can tell, neighbors with information were
also jurors deciding the case.24 Disposition occurred at the pleading
stage by plea or demurrer, by a trial verdict, or through settlement.25
But our primary focus is on the diagnostic aspect of procedure, espe-
cially as each party's integration of law and fact is communicated to
opposing counsel.
The common law system almost automatically accomplished the
diagnosis: the formal procedures integrated law and fact. From the
very initiation of the action, the writ system itself forced plaintiffs
counsel to place, if not torture, his situation into a writ cubbyhole. 26
Extremely limited joinder and the search for a single issue further
circumscribed the dispute, and forced the application of law to fact.27
With a dispute that was necessarily focused by the underlying procedu-
ral schema, we surmise that settlement discussion was frequently com-
23 See generally JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING'S COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING
THE MIDDLE AGES 62 (1913) (referring to the common law's "formulaic procedure");
F.W. MAITLAND, THE FoRMs OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES 4
(A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1936) ("'[A] form of action' has implied a par-
ticular original process, a particular mesne process, a particular final process, a partic-
ular mode of pleading, of trial, of judgment.").
24 SeeJoHNJ. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 953, 955 (8th
ed. 2001); FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.2, at 182 (5th ed. 2001).
25 See R. Ross PERRY, COMMON-LAW PLEADING: ITS HISTORY & PRINCIPLES 231-94
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1897) (explaining the rules and mechanics of issue
pleading).
26 See Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH.
REv. 10, 10-11 (1926):
In accordance with its technical mode of procedure, every species of legal
wrong was supposed to fit into some one of a limited number of classes; for
each class an appropriate remedy was provided, obtainable only by the use of
some one of a limited number of "forms of action."
27 SeeJOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING
§ 292, at 532 (1969) ("The reduction of the controversy to Issues is the great Object
of Pleading.").
2004] 1987
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mon and straightforward. For indeed, the practicing bar was small,
and thus the barristers were well known to each other;28 there are no
empirical studies to confirm that all of this happened as neatly and
tidily as we have described it, but neither is there evidence to the
contrary. 29
As a dominant procedure integrated law and fact in the law
courts, a broad substantive mandate integrated law and fact in eq-
uity. 30 In the earlier stages of equity, there were no technical proce-
dural requirements; 31 petitions declared a story of facts and perceived
unfairness justifying some formal intervention or relief.3 2 Limited dis-
covery could occur.33 And chancery disposed of the petition as equity
and good conscience demanded. 34 We know that the proliferation of
parties and issues could make resolution more complicated, less pre-
28 See PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 70-85 (1992)
(describing the development of the legal profession in the twelfth through fourteenth
centuries); J.H. Baker, Counsellors and Barristers: An Historical Study, 27 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
205 (1969) (discussing the historical relationship between barristers and other
branches of the legal profession).
29 SeeJ.H. BAKER, THE LAW'S TWO BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY (2001) (arguing that lawyers' law comes from outside the formal
sources such as statutes and reported cases).
30 See generally Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78
WASH. L. REV. 429, 454-59 (2003) (describing the integration of substance and proce-
dure in English common law courts prior to Blackstone).
31 See Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Centuy Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV.
834, 854 (1918) ("Less exactness of pleading was required than by the law, and even if
a bill were 'misconceived' the complainant was not out of court."); Roger L. Severns,
Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 89 (1934)
("No form was necessary and no strict procedure had to be followed."). Over time,
however, equity procedure became more complicated. See generally CHARLES A. KEIG-
WIN, CASES IN EQUITY PLEADING (2d ed. 1933) (describing the evolution of equity
pleading through an analysis of cases); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 13, at 13-14 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1857) (describing the vast
discretionary powers held by the courts); Melvin M.Johnson,Jr., The Spirit of Equity, 16
B.U. L. REV. 345, 350 (1936) ("Equity became handcuffed by a rigorous body of rules
and concepts.").
32 See William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to the Chancellor's Court, 17 CEO. LJ. 97, 106
(1929) ("The bill [in equity] was generally in simple form, without formality, and free
from the technical rules which applied to writs.").
33 Included as part of the bill in equity, for example, could be a series of interrog-
atories intended to obtain discovery in aid of the plaintiffs case. SeeJOHN ADAMS, THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUITY 306 (Robert Ralston ed., Philadelphia, T. &J. W. Johnson & Co.
1890).
34 See 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 385, at
524 (San Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 2d ed. 1892) ("[I]t is undeniable that
courts of equity do not recognize and protect the equitable rights of litigant parties,
unless such rights are, in pursuance of the settled juridical notions of morality, based
1988 [VOL. 79:5
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dictable, and in some instances, unlikely or impossible. 35 (Think Bleak
House.36) But throughout the stages of declaration, discovery, and dis-
position, the broad substantive mandate of Equity focused the court
on an integrated story of law and fact in a manner that demonstrated
that the story was not remediable by the law courts.
37
We know that the early American legal systems adopted modified
versions of the complementary systems of law and equity.38 The law
courts featured writs, single-issue pleading, and juries.3 9 Hence the
procedural rules forced some integration of law and fact. And suits in
equity were decided in accordance with the principles and practice of
equity jurisdiction as established in the High Court of Chancery in
England.40 Practicing within these systems was a relatively small prac-
upon conscience and good faith."); Main, supra note 30, at 440-59 (discussing the
differences in form between common law courts and equity/chancery courts).
35 See HENRY L. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY § 12, at 15 (1936) ("Because
of the numerous parties and intermingled issues, a jury trial in many suits in equity
would be a practicable impossibility .... .").
36 See CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Morton Dauwen Zabel ed., Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1956) (1853). Some scholars have suggested that Dickens's negative de-
piction of equity is exaggerated. See generally WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICK-
ENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN (1929) (examining the underlying legal themes abundant
in Charles Dickens's works).
37 See ADAMS, supra note 33, at 302-03 ("It must state the case in direct terms and
with reasonable certainty; not necessarily with the same technical precision as at law,
but with sufficient precision to show that there is a definite equity."). That equity
required the petitioner to show that there was "no adequate remedy at law" also en-
couraged an early integration of law and fact in order to meet this requirement. See
ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING § 60, at 29 (Cam-
bridge, Riverside Press 1895) ("[E]quity will not take jurisdiction whenever there is a
plain, adequate, and complete remedy at common law."); Warren B. Kittle, Courts of
Law and Equity-Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21, 29 (1919) ("It
was not . . . until the law courts began to administer justice in a more fixed and
certain manner that the equity courts adopted the rule that they would not take juris-
diction where there is a complete, adequate and plain remedy at law.").
38 See ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORI-
CAL PERSPECTrVE 39-42 (1952) (discussing the adoption and later modification of the
English legal system by American colonies); WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HIS-
TORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 68-77 (1923) (describing the feudal origins of
the various types of English courts); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909,
926-29 (1987) (examining the pre-twentieth century mentality concerning civil pro-
cedure in America).
39 Subrin, supra note 38, at 914-18.
40 Law and equity were administered on different "sides" of the federal court. See
Robert von Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 287,
287 (1927). For the early history of equity in the colonies and in the state courts, see
Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN
2004] 1989
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ticing bar and, thus, again, the integration of law and fact was a natu-
ral occurrence. 41 Indeed, the biographies of nineteenth century
lawyers leave one with the impression that the settlement of cases was
not burdened by an inability of opposing lawyers (who knew one an-
other well) to talk intelligently about their cases in a way that inte-
grated law and fact.42 Moreover, because many cases were tried, the
integration of law and fact would often also have occurred in open
court.
4 3
The story of code reform in the mid-nineteenth century is now
fairly well known. 44 Much like the writ system, the codes narrowed the
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 779 (Ass'n of American Law Schools ed., 1908); Jo-
seph H. Beale, Equity in America, 1 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 21-24 (1923).
41 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 309 (2d ed. 1985)
("Since many lawyers had no settled relations with definite clients, and since so much
of practice was litigation, their lives were spent in close contact with other lawyers, as
colleagues, friends, and friendly enemies.").
42 See, e.g., JOHN T. RICHARDS, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE LAWYER-STATESMAN 16, 17
(photo. reprint 1999) (1916) (recounting the familiarity and congeniality of lawyers,
judges, and clients with each other in Lincoln's time when the Circuit Court in any
county was on session). For a similar theme, see HENRY C. WHITNEY, LIFE ON THE
CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN, 39-71 (photo. reprint 2001) (1892) (detailing Lincoln's life as
an attorney on the Eighth Circuit). Most trial lawyers must have known each other in
any given community in the mid-nineteenth century. For example, in 1840 there
were only a total of 215 lawyers in Suffolk County, Massachusetts (which includes
Boston) and eighty-two lawyers in Middlesex County, Massachusetts (which includes
Cambridge). Barnstable County, which includes Cape Cod, had a total of eight law-
yers. Gerald W. Gawalt, Sources of Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts, 1740-1840,
reprinted in ESSAYS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 622, 627 (Wythe
Holt ed., 1976). Similarly, the Sacramento City Directory for the Year 1851 identifies fifty-
four lawyers. J. HORACE CULVER, SACRAMENTO CITY DIRECTORY FOR THE YEAR 1851, at
46 (photo. reprint 2000) (1851).
43 Some studies suggest very high trial rates for American courts in the nine-
teenth century. Indeed one study suggests that as many as half of certain types of
cases were resolved at trial. See Wayne McIntosh, 150 Years of Litigation and Dispute
Settlement: A Court Tale, 15 LAW & Soc'v REv. 823, 838-46 (1980-1981) (describing the
changes in case disposition in civil law cases from 1820-1970); see also Clinton W.
Francis, Practice, Strategy and Institution: Debt Collection in the English Common-Law Courts,
1740-1840, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 807, 872 (1986) (comparing English and American trial
rates).
44 See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 15-22 (1928)
(offering a brief history of the development of code pleading); Mildred V. Coe &
Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL
L.Q. 238 (1942) (providing a chronological enumeration of the New York Code of
Procedure Commissions); Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A
Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311 (1988) (using
the history of the Field Codes to dispel misconceptions about modern rules of civil
procedure).
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scope of cases and thereby limited the quantum of law and fact to be
integrated. For example, although the Field Code permitted some
joinder of claims and parties, 45 judges often forced a single theory
upon plaintiffs. 46 Moreover, the codes required plaintiffs to state "the
facts constituting the cause of action. ' 47 Plaintiffs were required to
plead facts supporting each element of their cause (s) of action. 48 The
standard narrowed the dispute because causes of action for which
there was no factual support at the pleading stage could be disposed
of as early as the pleading stage. And for cases that survived the plead-
ing stage, the parties and the court had the benefit of a complaint that
stated, or at least was supposed to state, the facts in support of each
element of a single cause of action; this might provide some effective
integration of law and fact. Of course, it is not entirely clear whether
what we have called "diagnosis" actually occurred in practice. Indeed,
Professor Steve Burbank tells us that Edson Sunderland, a Michigan
Law School professor who was instrumental in drafting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and was an astute observer of pre-Federal
Rule procedure and practice,
was firmly of the view that existing procedural systems for actions at
law in this country conduced to the needless and prolonged con-
sumption of resources, including judicial resources at trial-"eco-
nomic extravagance"-as a result of the absence of tools by which
the parties and the judge could determine the factual basis for a
pleader's allegations and denials and the issues actually in contro-
versy prior to trial (or for purposes of settlement) .49
45 Under the Field Code, plaintiffs could be joined if they had "an interest in the
subject of the action, and in obtaining the relief demanded," and defendants if they
had "an interest in the controversy, adverse to the plaintiff." 1848 N.Y. Laws 379
§§ 97-98. Several identified causes of action could be joined if the "causes of ac-
tion .. .equally affect[ed] all the parties to the action." Id. § 143.
46 See Subrin, supra note 38, at 940.
47 1848 N.Y. Laws 379 § 120(2) (reorganized as 1849 N.Y. Laws 438 § 142); see also
1851 N.Y. Laws 479 § 142 (requiring a "plain and concise statement of the facts consti-
tuting a cause of action").
48 Naturally there were arguments over what was a fact, an ultimate fact, evi-
dence, or conclusion of law. See Subrin, supra note 38, at 941. There was very little
pretrial discovery. Subrin, supra note 44, at 332-33.
49 Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Towards Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 3 J. EmP. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming
2004) (prepared for the Symposium on the Vanishing Trial, San Francisco, Califor-
nia, Dec. 12-14, 2003) (citing Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial
Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1937); Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of
Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 872-73 (1933)).
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The dawning of the twentieth century brought a wave of reform
to American procedure.50 Advocates for a less onerous civil proce-
dure urged the adoption of rules that would impose few or no techni-
cal requirements, 51 give judges broad discretion to administer cases, 52
and subordinate procedure to substance. 53 For example, with regard
to pleading obligations, reformers thought that litigants should be
permitted to tell their stories largely as they saw fit.5 4 This system
looked to equity for a model of relaxed narrative (or hardly a narra-
tive at all if one examines the forms attached to the Federal Rules55 ),
liberal joinder of claims and parties, and some form of discovery.56
Charles Clark, the major draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, outlined the evolution in pleading in the second edition of
his treatise on code pleading, published in 1947:
Under the common-law system the pleadings were expected to for-
mulate the issue to be tried. The original ideal was that the plead-
50 See Subrin, supra note 38, at 943-75 (focusing on the contributions of predomi-
nant equity proponents in the early twentieth century).
51 See id.
52 See Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure II: Plead-
ings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1323 (1935):
In fact if the vital provisions for a completely united procedure with clear
specifications as to jury trials and waiver thereof are adopted, and if flexible
rules as to pleadings and parties, leaving much to the discretion of the trial
court, are drafted, we shall feel that the reform is assured of success,
whatever the detailed provisions may be.
Id.; Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 U. ILL. L. REv. 388, 402 (1910)
("It should be for the court, in its discretion, not the parties, to vindicate rules of
procedure intended solely to provide for the orderly dispatch of business, saving of
public time, and maintenance of the dignity of tribunals; and such discretion should
be reviewable only for abuse.").
53 See Roscoe Pound, A Practical Program of Procedural Reform, 22 GREEN BAG 438,
438 (1910).
[A]fter a period of rigidity in practice, in which substance has been sacri-
ficed to form and end has been subordinated to means, we are evidently
about to enter upon a period of liberality in which the substance shall pre-
vail and the machinery of justice shall be restrained by and made strictly to
serve the end for which it exists.
Id. See generally Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid ofjustice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938)
(noting a trend in procedural rules toward undue rigidity at odds with developing
substantive law).
54 See generally Subrin, supra note 38, at 943-75 (focusing on the contributions of
the predominant equity proponents of the early twentieth century).
55 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. app. of forms, form 9.
56 See generally Subrin, supra note 38, at 943-75 (describing how and why propo-
nents of uniform federal procedural rules looked to equity procedure and thought
for their model).
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ings should disclose the material facts of the case. The modern view
is that the pleadings should give fair notice of the pleader's case to
the opposing party and to the court.
Simplified pleading is not alone sufficient to provide the basis
for complete, as well as effective, adjudication of disputes; it should
be employed in an action made broadly inclusive of all issues be-
tween the immediate parties, as well as allied issues involving other
parties who may be brought before the court.
5 7
So, when, in this brave new procedural world, would the diagnos-
tic function of civil procedure take place? Or, put another way, when
would the parties integrate law and fact to advocate and persuade?
The demurrer had become the "12(b) (6) motion to dismiss,' '5 8 and
the Dioguardi v. Durning and Conley v. Gibson decisions confirmed the
dubious utility of this motion.59 In Conley, for example, the Court held
"that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."60 Con-
sistent with the liberal regime of notice pleading, the motion to dis-
miss presented but a minimal threshold for specificity in pleading-
requiring nothing resembling a meaningful integration of law and
fact.61
In these pre-Celotex62 days, the motion for summary judgment was
discouraged. The Supreme Court in Adickes provided what appeared
57 CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 54 (2d ed.
1947).
58 See also FED. R. Crv. P. 7(c) ("Demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficiency
of a pleading shall not be used.").
59 See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-48 (1957); Dioguardi v. Durning, 139
F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
60 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
61 See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Require-
ments in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 948 (1990). Blaze's article
describes that, under the original scheme of the Federal Rules, pleading
plays a relatively unimportant and limited role in the litigation process. The
complaint operates only to initiate the process and to identify the nature of
the dispute. The rules are crafted to insulate the pleading phase of litigation
from any involvement in substantive resolution of the merits, except in lim-
ited and narrowly defined circumstances.
Id.; see also 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1202, at 75 (2d ed. 1990) (remarking that "a sixteen year-old boy could
plead under these rules") (quoting AM. BAR ASS'N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIL PROCE-
DURE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 220
(1938)).
62 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). One study concluded that, prior
to Celotex, approximately 1.5% of all federal cases were disposed of by summaryjudg-
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to most as an extremely rigorous test for achieving summary judg-
ment.63 Some appellate courts basically advised the lower courts not
to grant them.64 As a sign in a courtroom in New Orleans said, "No
spitting. No summary judgments." 65 Accordingly lawyers found them-
selves, in some cases, with many claims, myriad issues, extensive dis-
covery, undigested facts, and no formal law/fact analysis. Indeed,
prior to the days of the mandatory pretrial conference, it may not
have been customary practice even to provide a trial memorandum to
the court or the other side. 66
ment. See William P. McLauchlan, An Empirical Study of the Federal Summary Judgment
Rule, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 449-57 (1977) (detailing a study based on cases filed in
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970). Professor Stephen Burbank concludes, in a
forthcoming article, that the empirical evidence shows that summary judgment began
to take a more prominent role at least a decade prior to Celotex and the "trilogy" of
Supreme Court summary judgment opinions. See Burbank, supra note 49.
63 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1970) (requiring movant to
proffer affirmative evidence to conclusively negate an element of the plaintiff's cause
of action in order to obtain summary judgment); see Ernest Gellhorn & William F.
Robinson, Jr., Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84 HARV. L. REV. 612,
614 (1971):
[C]ourts seldom rely on summary judgment to decide cases involving com-
plicated or voluminous evidence, especially when the legal question is novel
or significant. As a result, it has been recognized that although Rule 56 is
available in all types of litigation, there are certain types of cases that by the
nature of the issues involved do not lend themselves to summary
adjudication.
64 See NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1952) (stressing the
importance of oral testimony in equity actions); Gerard L. Goettel, From the Bench:
Appellate Factfinding-and Other Atrocities, 13 LITIGATION 7, 7 (1986) ("[T] he appellate
courts have made summary judgment impotent."); see also Glenn S. Koppel, The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Speaks Out on Summary Judgment in its Own "Trilogy" of Decisions:
Has the Celotex Era Arrived?, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 483, 485 (2002) (referring to
"summaryjudgment's traditional status as a procedural pariah"); Lawrence W. Pierce,
Summary Judgment: A Favared Means of Summarily Resolving Disputes, 53 BRooK L. REV.
279, 279 (1987) ("When a prominent litigator was asked to discuss the topic of sum-
mary judgment at the 1977 Second CircuitJudicial Conference, he quipped 'There is
none in this Circuit ... it takes a touch of Pollyanna for any of us to even consider the
motion any longer.'").
65 See Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review in Federal Civil Appeals: Fifth Circuit
Illustration and Analysis, 29 Lov. L. REV. 851, 854 (1983); see also Jividen v. Law, 461
S.E.2d 451, 459 n.11 (W. Va. 1995) ("The same sign might just as recently have ap-
peared in one of the many county courthouses in West Virginia.").
66 Cf William M. Byrne, Remarks at the Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Seminar on Procedures Prior to Trial (June 25, 1957),
in 20 F.R.D. 485, 496-97 (1957):
I see that Clerk Paul O'Brien of the Court of Appeals is handing each of you
a copy of our pre-trial rule. You will observe that we require the filing of a
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As early as 1925, O.L. McCaskill criticized Clark's view of proce-
dure in a manner that has proved prescient. He had expressed the
concern that
flexibility may be carried to such an extreme that our procedural
machine will have no stability .... Leaving to the trial judge the
fixation of the scope of the cause of action does not make for ad-
ministrative convenience. It ignores one of the most useful pur-
poses of the cause of action as a procedural unit in the action. It
ignores the function of a pleading as an instrument of preparation
for the trial. 67
With the effectiveness of 12(b) (6) motions and summary judgments
neutralized by the liberal vision of procedure, and with the increase of
other relevant variables (such as the size of the bar, the amount of
civil litigation, the proliferation of statutes and new causes of action,
and the utilization of discovery) problems associated with delays, ex-
pense, and invasions of privacy have proliferated-especially in cases
where the stakes warranted increased attention by lawyers. 68 In short,
as McCaskill suggested, the failure of the Federal Rules to focus litiga-
tion on what is essential for each party's case, when combined with
other variables, results in a certain murkiness and a lack of definition,
containment, and restraint in the civil litigation process. It should
hardly surprise, then, that many of the procedural reform efforts of
memorandum of contentions of fact and law. This memorandum must con-
tain a concise statement of the material facts involved as claimed by each
party, including where negligence or contributory negligence is in issue, the
party alleging it shall, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked,
specify each claimed act or omission relied upon to establish negligence or
contributory negligence, and where damage to personal property is in issue,
the precise nature and extent of the injury and damage shall be specified.
We also require-a brief statement of the points of law and citation of author-
ity for each point upon which such party relies.
67 O.L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE LJ. 614, 620 (1925).
68 See Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lauyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. Ries. J. 787, 871-73 (explaining how, as the
opportunities and incentives for discovery abuse increase, the ability of the courts to
adequately control discovery abuse is strained and diminished); see also Warren E.
Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, Keynote Address
Before the National Conference on Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admin-
istration ofJustice (April 7, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 83-95 (1976) (asking whether the
tools of procedure and methods ofjudicial process are suited for a complex modern
society); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, Address Before the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfac-
tion with the Administration of Justice (April 7, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 199-211
(1976) (discussing overuse of discovery and litigation as growth industry in context of
complex litigation).
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the past several decades could be described as attempts to more effec-
tively and efficiently integrate law and fact: requiring heightened
pleading,69 imposing sanctions for the lack of reasonable pretrial in-
vestigation of law or fact,70 remodeling discovery, 71 resurrecting sum-
mary judgment practice, 72 and promoting the managerial role of
judges. 73
69 See generally Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551
(2002) (comparing the heightened pleading requirements in the civil rights context
with that of securities fraud actions); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of
Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1749 (1998) (reflecting on the broader implications
of recent reforms in pleading for civil rights and securities fraud litigation).
70 See William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 181 (1985) (reporting that "[w]idespread concern over frivolous liti-
gation and abusive practices of attorneys led to the amendment in 1983 of Rule 11");
see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example
of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1953-54 (1989) (noting the "inescapable connec-
tion between the factual and legal components of the Rule 11 certification").
71 See generally Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REv. 747
(1998) (chronicling the recent history of discovery reform);Jeffrey W. Stempel, Polit-
ics and Sociology in Federal Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REv. 529 (2001) (assess-
ing proposals for narrowing the scope of discovery); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving
the "Haves" a Little More: Considering the 1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REv. 229
(1999) (arguing that the 1998 discovery proposals were unwise); Carl Tobias, Discoveiy
Reform Redux, 31 CON. L. REV. 1433 (1999) (discussing the ironies replete in the
mandatory automatic disclosure requirement); Gregory S. Weber, Potential Innovations
in Civil Discovery: Lessons for California From the State and Federal Courts, 32 McGEORGE L.
REv. 1051 (2001) (identifying and discussing innovative discovery devices from the
several state and federal courts).
72 See generally Steven Alan Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts
at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183 (1987) (describing the factual basis for legal sum-
mary judgment); Gary T. Foremaster, The Movant's Burden in a Motion for Summary
Judgment, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 731 (1987) (discussing the implications of the Court's
decision in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases on Summary Judgment:
Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 770 (1988)
(discussing the theoretical problems and policy considerations that have stood in the
way of the widespread use of summary judgment).
73 See generally E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306 (1986) (defining and assessing the role of managerial judging
in civil procedure reform); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994) (evaluating the
effectiveness of settlement promotion by judges); Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. Pir. L. REv. 789
(1989) (evaluating judges' role as case manager and settlement facilitator); Arthur R.
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 19-22, 24-29
(1984) (calling for increased judicial activity in an effort to decrease the adversarial
nature of litigation); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376, 377
(1982) (explaining how "managerial judges" are "shaping litigation and influencing
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Yet let us consider more methodically what documents, in the for-
mal process of litigation, in fact, require an integrated narrative of law
and fact to be filed with the court or shared with the other side.7 4 The
pleading rules surely do not require a very expansive or sophisticated
integration of law and fact. 75 Plaintiffs still enjoy a liberal standard of
notice pleading, as efforts by judges to impose heightened pleading
requirements have been soundly rejected by the Supreme Court.76
Today Rule 8(a) remains in its original form, and only through legisla-
tive reform in limited contexts has the liberal standard of notice
pleading been altered. 77 Nor are defendants required by rule or even
permitted to offer a narrative by way of defense. 78 Sanctions have been
perceived as a mechanism to deter dilatory behavior and to streamline
results"); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1969 (discussing the objectives of Rule 16, its his-
tory, and application).
74 We realize that litigation lawyers may at even early stages of a litigation create
in their heads or files a narrative of what they happened to put into the applicable
legal framework. Some trial lawyers say that at the very beginning of the case they
think about what their closing argument to ajury would sound like, thus producing a
narrative of law and facts in which to consider their future action in the case, such as
discovery they will need.
75 With regard to the availability of facts at the pleading stage, Federal Rule
8(a) (2) was drafted deliberately to avoid usage of the terms "fact" and "cause of ac-
tion" and the confusion they caused. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
("[T] he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail
the facts upon which he bases his claim."). Although we focus primarily on federal
court procedure, we note that most states have adopted the federal pleading stan-
dard. See generally Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of
Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States that Have Not Adopted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REv. 311 (2001) (suggesting conformity with the
federal standard even in code states); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal
Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1367 (1986) (reviewing formal adoption of the Federal Rules). The Oakley and Coon
survey is brought up to date in John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State
Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2002/2003).
76 See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding, in a unanimous opinion, that Rule 8(a) "meant
what it said"). "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set
out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim." Id. (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at
47); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-15 (2002) (describing a
heightened pleading standard conflicting with Rule 8(2) (2)).
77 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act imposes heightened pleading re-
quirements in Exchange Act claims for securities fraud actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b) (2000). Further, the Y2KAct imposed heightened pleading with regard to issues
of damages, defects, and state of mind. See 15 U.S.C. § 6607.
78 Defendants must, in "short and plain terms" state their affirmative defenses,
assert counterclaims (pursuant to the pleading mandate of Rule 8(a)), and "admit or
deny the averments upon which the adverse party relies." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b).
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litigation at the pleading stage. 79 Rule 11 presently requires a pre-fil-
ing inquiry into the law and facts, but this is not a pleading rule and
does not trigger the production and exchange of an integrated narra-
tive of law and fact.80
But just as code pleading may not have, in the real world of law-
yers and their work, provided as much diagnosis and integration as
the rules intended, lawyers today may be doing more integration of
law and fact in their pleadings than one would surmise from just read-
ing the relevant Federal Rules. A recent article entitled The Myth of
Notice Pleading suggests, for example, that in a wide variety of case
types, ranging from antitrust and copyright to defamation and negli-
gence, the courts are requiring more articulation of facts than pre-
scribed by the language of the relevant rules.8 1 Moreover, for a variety
of reasons, such as trying to demonstrate compliance with Federal
Rule II or trying to precipitate a favorable settlement, lawyers might
be integrating law and fact in more detail in their complaints than
required by rule. Judge Posner suggests, with some regret, that more
prolix complaints are the norm in federal court:
The idea of "a plain and short statement of the claim" has not
caught on. Few complaints follow the models in the Appendix of
Forms. Plaintiffs' lawyers, knowing that some judges read a com-
plaint as soon as it is filed in order to get a sense of the suit, hope by
pleading facts to "educate" (that is to say, influence) the judge with
regard to the nature and probable merits of the case, and also hope
to set the stage for an advantageous settlement by showing the de-
fendant what a powerful case they intend to prove.8 2
It is important to note, however, that mere detail in a complaint
does not necessarily create an integrated narrative. Averments are
made in numbered paragraphs and the content of each paragraph
"shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of
circumstances." 3 The paragraphs, in turn, are then often grouped
into myriad counts without any signal to the reader of the relative
strength or importance of the theories pursued. Such presentation
can lead to a syncopated rhythm that does not resemble a coherent
79 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFsTRA L. REV. 499, 500 (1986) (citing Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986)).
80 See FED. R. Crv. P. 11(b)(2) (certifying that "the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law").
81 See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiz. L. REV. 987,
1011-59 (2003).
82 Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723-24 (1986).
83 FED. R. Crv. P. 10(b).
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narrative. Indeed, the primary audience for a complaint is often, if
not usually the judge, while advocacy documents, such as demand let-
ters, are primarily drafted to convince the opposing party or lawyer or
a corporate defendant's management group or the person with the
authority to setde.
Discovery has long been the focus of reformers decrying ineffi-
ciency and delay in the federal system.84 An integrated narrative of
law and fact could be useful at the discovery stage to cabin discovery
around the essential issues-especially in the five to ten percent of
"big cases" that have extensive discovery.85 Recent reforms to the dis-
covery rules have added a new tier of "mandatory initial disclosures";86
limited the quantity of certain types of discovery;87 and narrowed the
scope of discovery.88 Yet notice pleading and liberal joinder rules
conspire to permit broad discovery, and no integrated narrative is re-
quired by rule either before or at this stage.
The 1983 amendments to Federal Rule 16 were intended to en-
hance case management, expedite the disposition of cases, facilitate
settlement and ensure the more efficient handling of cases. 89 Al-
though the Rule contemplates that the parties would discuss the use
84 See sources cited supra note 71 (chronicling recent trends in discovery reform).
85 It is difficult to make a firm estimate on how many cases have massive discovery
(however defined), but five to ten percent seems to be in the ballpark. See Stephen N.
Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-
Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. RE,. 27, 45 (1994).
86 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (listing required disclosures). See generally Samuel Is-
sacharoff & George Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73
TEX. L. REv. 753 (1995) (evaluating the impact of mandatory disclosure); Linda S.
Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemak-
ing, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991) (proposing that the politicization of the rulemaking
process will lead to ineffective rulemaking).
87 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (2) (A) (permitting ten-depositions); FED. R. Crv.
P. 33(a) (permitting twenty-five interrogatories). See generally Arthur R. Miller, The
Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency
Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982
(2003) (arguing for limits on trial courts' discretion to dismiss cases).
88 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any mat-
ter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party .... For good
cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter
involved in the action."). See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round
Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REv. 13
(2001) (arguing that the 2000 Limitation will be ineffective in limiting discovery).
89 FED. R. Civ. P. 16; see Charles R. Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considera-
tions for the Bench and Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599 (1989) (providing an overview of the trends
in Rule 16 litigation); Shapiro, supra note 4 (discussing the theory and practice of
Federal Rule 16).
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of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute, 90 it does not re-
quire the parties to prepare an integrated narrative of law and fact as
part of the formal litigation system. 91 It is worth noting that the Man-
ual for Complex Litigation (Third) contemplates something akin to an
integrated narrative of law and fact, but cautions against requiring
them "routinely."92
If not by pleadings, discovery, or a case management order, then
the only remaining pretrial stage for the formal litigation system to
require an integrated narrative is summary judgment. Typically by a
local rule derivative of Federal Rule 56,93 parties filing or responding
to a motion for summary judgment must file a supporting memoran-
dum addressing whether there are disputed issues of material fact and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
But the argument on a summary judgment motion often focuses on a
limited number of elements of claims and defenses and/or whether
the evidence is overwhelming and therefore must be believed. Be-
cause the persuasiveness of the evidence on disputed facts is not dis-
positive, these memoranda by no means always offer an integrated
narrative with regard to the entire case.
That leaves only the trial. Although a pretrial conference memo-
randum may include a summary of the case, suggesting a narrative,
the primary purpose of the document, for most lawyers, is to protect
their ability to put into evidence whatever they decide they want to
introduce during the trial. The memorandum thus is rarely a narra-
90 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
91 Cf FED. R. Cfv. P. 16(c) ("At any conference under this rule consideration may
be given, and the court may take appropriate action, with respect to . . . (1) the
formulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous
claims or defenses . . ).
92 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.641, at 122 (1995).
One of the methods sometimes used to ensure adequate preparation,
streamline the evidence, and prevent unfair surprise is statements of facts
and evidence, or contentions and proof. Each party prepares and submits a
statement listing the facts it intends to establish at trial and the supporting
evidence. The statement should be sufficiently detailed to be informative
and complete, but free of argument and conclusions. No evidence not in-
cluded in the statement would be permitted at trial. The exchange of such
statements may be useful in narrowing factual disputes and expediting the
trial. The substantial amount of work required for their preparation, how-
ever, may outweigh the benefits, and such statements should not be required
routinely without prior consideration.
Id. (citation omitted).
93 In light of our thesis, it is worth emphasizing that Federal Rule 56 does not
even require a memorandum in support of a motion for summaryjudgment. See FED.
R. Cirv. P. 56. Such requirements are the product of local rules.
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tive of law and fact integrated for the purpose of convincing the other
side. The formal procedural universe thus may not demand an inte-
grated narrative of law and fact until the occurrence of a trial-specifi-
cally, the opening statement or closing argument. The extent to
which pleadings, summary judgment memoranda, or pretrial docu-
mentation in practice provide a sophisticated diagnosis and integra-
tion, despite the lack of a rule mandate, may be a fruitful area for
empirical research. We may have underestimated what is being ac-
complished by the current formal rule system and overestimated the
utility of pleadings under common law and code systems.
II. THE UNCHARTED PARALLEL PROCEDURAL UNIVERSE
If you have followed us so far, you will have accepted that the
essential diagnostic function-integrating law and fact in a manner
shared with the court and all parties-may have occurred much ear-
lier under the code, common law, and equity systems that preceded
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; at a minimum, the predecessor
systems attempted to focus and limit civil cases in ways that made diag-
nosis easier to accomplish. Moreover, we have described how the cur-
rent procedural regime-with notice pleading, liberal joinder, and
broad discovery-makes it uncertain that the opponent will under-
stand the law and pertinent facts of the other party's case. Yet statis-
tics suggest that only a small percentage of cases will be exposed to the
law-fact integration that is afforded by trial. Probably fewer than three
percent of commenced civil cases reach trial-a precipitous drop
from any distant benchmark.94 Although we have found it impossible
94 The overall completed state trial rate was estimated at 2.9% of all terminations
for 1991-1992; the federal rate was 3.7%. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Out-
comes in State and Federal Court: A Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 433, 440-42
tbl.3 (1996). But we know that the federal trial rate has dropped in recent years. For
instance, in 2000, only 2.2% of federal civil cases reached trial (5780 trials of 259,234
total civil cases terminated). ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2000 AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 159
tbl.C-4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2000/contents.html. For the
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2002, 2.3% of the terminated civil cases
ended with a trial (6015 trials of 259,537 terminated civil cases; 44% of the tried cases
were before ajury-2650 jury cases of the total of 6015 tried civil cases). ADMINISTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 123 tbl.C, 162 tbl.C-4, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/contents.html. Between 1998 and 2002, federal "civil
nonjury trials and civil jury trials decreased by 1859 trials, respectively." Id. at 24. A
new federal court study shows that in 2002 the percentage of federal civil cases tried
had dropped to 1.8% from 11.5% in 1962. Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, But Fewer
Ever Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al. In 1940, the percentage
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to find reliable statistics, probably approximately sixty-five to seventy
percent settle.95 Surely this vast number of settled cases is not being
resolved without a meaningful integration of law and fact. But where
and how, in a world of increasing numbers of cases, cases with in-
creased numbers of issues and parties, fewer trials, and lawyers often
not knowing their lawyer adversaries, are the litigants' stories shared?
It should not surprise that the answer to this question lies beyond the
familiar constellation of formal rules and doctrine.96
Lawyers are practical and professional problem solvers: they want
to find effective ways to advocate for their clients. Our friends and
former students who are civil litigators tell us that it is increasingly
common for lawyers to send demand letters, other (settlement) corre-
spondence, notebooks, edifying brochures and documentary videos to
the other side. The demand letter is likely the most popular of these
advocacy statements that integrate law and fact. Today a "demand let-
ter" is frequently much more elaborate than a pro forma demand for
payment or a simple and inflated settlement demand.97 Demand let-
of civil cases terminated during or after trial in the U.S. District Courts was 15.2%. See
Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4,
44 tbl.2 (1983).
95 In a 1994 article, Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill estimated that the settlement
rate, "cases that do settle without a definitive judicial ruling," was two-thirds. See Ga-
lanter & Cahill, supra note 73, at 1339-40 (1994). In the same year, Professor Yeazell
estimated that seventy percent of cases are either settled or abandoned. See Stephen
C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631,
662. Professor Gillian Hadfield has evidently said that settlement rates are in decline,
and "it looks as though the percentage of cases terminated in settlement has fallen by
between 10 and fifteen percentage points, from approximately fifty percent in 1970 to
between thirty-five and forty percent during the 1980's and 1990's." Liptak, supra
note 94. She also apparently has said that "'non-trial adjudications ... based only on
papers submitted [to judges] by the parties have risen to fifty percent." Id. She has
been reported as saying, however, that "[w]e need to follow up on this initial study to
confirm these numbers." Id. These are the lowest settlement estimates we have seen,
and if they are true nationwide we would find it very surprising. Such low settlement
figures are not what we experienced in practice, nor what we are told by other
lawyers.
96 See Thomas 0. Main, "An Overwhelming Question" About Non-Formal Procedure, 3
NE-V. L.J. 388 (2003) (discussing the influence of non-formal forms of law in the con-
text of procedural rules); Main, supra note 75 (demonstrating the influential role of a
local legal culture in merging disparate rule regimes); Frederick Schauer, Formalism,
97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing the divergent use of the term "formalism").
97 Of course, we do not mean to suggest that brief letters cannot accomplish
much. "Cornelius Vanderbilt once wrote a 'gentleman' who had acted dishonorably
in a financial matter, 'You have undertaken to cheat me. I will not sue you because
the law takes too long. I will ruin you."' Jerry Buchmeyer, The Process: Demand Letters
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ters now often include a sophisticated and integrated narrative of law
and fact written to persuade. These letters read much like a closing
argument to a judge or jury. The tone is determined by what the law-
yer thinks will persuade the other parties to settle.
There is literature of a practical nature offering advice. A recent
article in the Student Lawyer recommends that demand letters be sent
prior to commencing litigation. The author suggests that the letter
"should be reasonable and realistic," and further advises the nascent
lawyer to
achieve the right tone and level of specificity. One legitimate pur-
pose of a demand letter is to intimidate, so adopt a formal tone. Be
sure the recipient understands (1) your client's point of view, (2)
what your client wants, (3) the specific deadline for complying, and
(4) that you have taken account of the recipient's essential position
and found it either wholly or partly unmeritorious.98
Similarly, a 2003 article in Trial, a magazine for more exper-
ienced practitioners, points out that when insurance is involved
[a]n adjuster sets a reserve-the amount that the defense initially
claims a case is worth-based on the information the plaintiff attor-
ney provides. Many trial lawyers dictate a quick demand letter out-
lining the high points of the case and forward it to the adjuster with
a medical record or two. A hasty letter typically does not get the job
done. It sends the wrong message about your abilities and resolve.
To get the results you want, prepare a detailed settlement-demand
package that includes:
* a synopsis of the case facts
* an explanation of legal liability
* a detailed explanation of the economic and non-economic dam-
ages, as well as how your client's life has been affected by the
injury
" photographs of the injury and the accident scene
* investigative reports . . .bills and expenses
* any other documents that support your claim.99
and Settlements, 45 TEX. B.J. 837, 837 (1982); see also id. ("H. Allen Smith reported this
gem by an Indian attorney: 'Dear -, If you do not pay the money you owe my
client, I will take steps that will cause you the utmost damned astonishment. Yours
very truly."').
98 Bryan A. Garner, Legal Writing-Demand Letters are Designed to Produce Results for
Your Clients, STUDENT LAW., Apr. 2002, at 9, 9.
99 John Elliott Leighton, Prepare for Trial, But Win at Settlement, TRAL, June 2003,
at 26, 28. In personal injury cases, for example, it is suggested that the plaintiff's
lawyer make available to the opposition: (1) family photos, film, or video; (2) letters
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This "settlement-demand package" thus includes an integrated diag-
nosis of the law and facts, as well as a preliminary disclosure of impor-
tant discovery documents. And all of this is happening in the parallel
non-formal procedural universe.
Integrated advocacy statements simulate some of the integration
of law and fact that might occur at trial. An article in the American
Journal of Trial Advocacy suggests the preparation of a "settlement bro-
chure," including a "comprehensive statement of the case . . . [with]
case documentation [and] appropriate graphics."100 Some of the
literature describes elaborate videos designed to convince defendants,
particularly insurance companies in personal injury cases, to settle in
an amount advantageous to the plaintiff.
Major lawsuits are settled too often on the eve of trial simply be-
cause the eve of trial is the first time all of the relevant law and facts have
been adequately packaged and presented to the insurance company or adverse
party. The uncertainty of what evidence will be produced at trial-
and how the jury will perceive it-is part of what makes some cases
difficult to settle. A video documentary is, in effect a "mini trial"; it
gives the insurance carrier a vivid illustration of the evidence that
the plaintiff would produce at trial. The video documentary can
help plaintiff's counsel communicate the true value of the case and
the likelihood that a jury may award the plaintiff the true value.
The video can help you achieve a fair and adequate settlement;
therefore the video can help you receive the amount that a jury
would likely award, discounted by savings from minimizing litiga-
tion expense, uncertainty and delay. 10 1
Another Dallas lawyer lauds the "video settlement documentary"
as a "far more powerful communications tool" than the "printed set-
tlement brochure . . . in what former ATLA President Melvin Belli
once called the plaintiff's 'rush to disclosure."' 1 0 2 Video forces a "re-
view [of] the case in its entirety" and allows "plaintiff counsel a rare
opportunity to tell the client's story without interruption by cross-ex-
and cards (such as valentines) to document love and affection; (3) medical parapher-
nalia, such as replicas of implants or braces and catheters (4) medical films or slides;
(5) medical records and x-rays; (6) news and governmental photographs, film and
video; (7) injury photographs; (8) medical drawings; and (9) graphs and charts. See
Fred Misko, Jr., Packaging a Case for Settlement or Trial, 17 AM. J. TmAI_ Anvoc. 461,
462-66 (1993).
100 Misko, supra note 99, at 461.
101 Id. at 466-67 (emphasis added).
102 Windle Turley, Getting to "Yes" with the Video Settlement Documentary, TRma, June
2003, at 50, 51.
[VOL- 79:52004
INTEGRATION OF LAW AND FACT
aminations, objections, and other trial-related procedural breaks in
continuity. 10
3
Advice and guidance about the effective use of these integrated
advocacy statements is directed almost exclusively to plaintiffs, and
primarily to personal injury cases. Our interviews, however, suggest
that plaintiffs' lawyers in diverse types of cases, including employment,
commercial, discrimination, intellectual property, and disability litiga-
tion frequently utilize lengthy documents, in the nature of a demand
letter, to present their best case to the defendant prior to trial. More-
over, various provisions of substantive law now require, or make it oth-
erwise desirable, that an initial letter or other document explaining
the plaintiffs legal and factual position be sent to the defendant as a
prerequisite to filing suit. 10 4
Defense lawyers may not leave the demand letter unanswered.
Sometimes they also want an integrated document that the plaintiffs
lawyer can show to her client. The defendant is often an insurance
company that needs a thoughtful law/fact response to the demand in
order to protect itself against the claim of a bad faith failure to settle.
Such a claim can expose the insurer to liability in excess of the policy
limit if the plaintiff obtains a verdict beyond that limit and the com-
pany is later found to have been unreasonable in its failure to make a
reasonable offer of settlement. 05
We asked the lawyers we interviewed why plaintiffs were more
vested than defendants in the enterprise of creating integrated advo-
103 Id. Professor Howard Erichson has told us about a West Virginia lawyer who
produces a "digital settlement" compact disc to be given to defense counsel. He has
also provided us with the settlement package protocol describing what plaintiffs
should provide in order to facilitate settlements in the Baycol Products litigation.
104 See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAW. ANN. C. 176D § 3 (imposing liability for amounts in
excess of policy coverage where insurer has failed to settle a claim in good faith); Cain
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 794 (1975) (using implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing to impose a duty upon insurers to make good
faith settlement offers). See generally Michael Sean Quinn, The Defending Liability In-
surer's Duty to Settle: A Meditation Upon Some First Principles, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 929
(2000) (discussing the duty that insurers have to settle cases); Stephen R. Schmidt,
The Bad Faith Setup, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 705, 716 (1994) (discussing response strategy);
Alan 0. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liability Insurers to Settle or Litigate:
An Economic Critique, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1345 (1994) (discussing bad faith litigation be-
tween insurers and insureds); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113
(1990) (examining the effect of liability insurance on tort litigation). Sometimes an
insured will file a complaint with an insurance commissioner's office; authors have
suggested the efficacy of a complete advocacy response. Ronald J. Clark et al., First
Party Bad Faith, in 2 LAw AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 28.2
(David L. Leitner et al. eds., 2002).
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cacy statements. They provided many possible explanations. First,
plaintiffs are more likely to be proactive because it is usually the plain-
tiff who is trying to alter the status quo and who, ultimately, has the
burden of proof; defendant's use of contested money during the liti-
gation can justify passivity. Second, some suggested that counsel who
will be paid on a contingency fee are more likely to make early efforts
to effect a settlement than counsel paid on an hourly basis.
We found a more profound reason for the use of advocacy mater-
ials delivered by plaintiffs' counsel lurking within these attorneys' ex-
planations. In a typical civil case, the defendant is either a
corporation or some entity that is insured. In many cases, then, it is
the management of that defendant corporation or insurance com-
pany who must assess their potential exposure and understand the
value of the plaintiffs case. Consequently, the plaintiff's lawyer, in
order to settle a case advantageously, must get convincing pro-plaintiff
information into the hands of the ultimate decisionmaker. An inte-
grated narrative combining the plaintiffs strongest case on the law
and facts is the best way to do this-whether through an extensive
demand letter, a settlement brochure or notebook, a video documen-
tary, or some combination of these.
Because the plaintiff is often a "one-shot" litigator as opposed to a
"repeat player,"' 0 6 plaintiffs lawyers may have more influence than
defense counsel over strategy and decisionmaking processes, includ-
ing settlement. Accordingly, it is the plaintiffs lawyer who often must
be convinced about the wisdom and merits of settlement. But the de-
fense lawyer need not produce a document that explains defendant's
case because that lawyer can talk directly to the plaintiffs lawyer, who
may be making the decision. Moreover, since the defendant does not
normally have to prove anything, and can just sit back and poke holes
in the plaintiffs position, defense counsel are reluctant to say any
more than the minimum. Further, if the plaintiffs lawyer is not a
sophisticated player or an experienced trial lawyer, defense counsel
are not inclined to do anything that might signal to the plaintiffs law-
yer that the defendants are taking the case seriously. Where the plain-
tiff is a corporation and, thus, also a repeat player, the lawyers with
whom we spoke suggested that there was more likely to be an ex-
change of some form of integrated narrative by both sides. Of course,
under these circumstances, both plaintiffs and defendants have the
106 We use the terminology of Marc Galanter. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 95, 97
(1974).
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incentive to get a persuasive advocacy statement into the hands of the
decisionmaking management on the other side.
The lawyers we interviewed described a dramatic increase in the
use of expansive demand letters, extensive notebooks, and other advo-
cacy statements outside the formal procedural universe. Although
some lawyers have long benefited from sending detailed demand let-
ters or trial-like notebooks,10 7 more lawyers are using them and are
experimenting with creative solutions. Several variables seem to have
contributed to this phenomenon. The litigator knows that a trial is a
most unlikely form of disposition; trials resolve a tiny fraction of the
civil cases that are filed and most cases settle,108 although some cases
are resolved by dispositive motion. 109 The expense and delay of litiga-
tion-a popular subject of concern since the mid-1970s-have made
clients and, in turn, their lawyers, inclined to pursue ever-earlier dis-
positions. Because so few cases are tried, there is less incentive or rea-
son to resist disclosure to benefit from the surprise at trial. Moreover,
because of extensive discovery, the odds of really surprising the oppo-
nent have been substantially reduced. Accordingly, the trends favor
increased disclosure.' 10
Another variable that may contribute to this phenomenon is the
lack of familiarity among members of the contemporary bar with one
another."' Several lawyers we interviewed agreed that since the plain-
tiffs lawyer may well be unknown to the defendant's lawyer, and so
few cases are tried in which the plaintiffs lawyer can build up a repu-
tation, an expansive demand letter or the like is a means for the plain-
tiff's lawyer to show her skill, determination, and preparation. A
107 One lawyer told us that a well known judge in Massachusetts was admired, as a
lawyer, for sending astonishingly complete, brilliantly drafted demand letters in em-
ployment discrimination cases. The local bar called her letters "Oh S**t!" letters,
because this is what defendants and their counsel thought upon review of these per-
suasive letters. Interview at Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, in Boston, Mass.
(July 16, 2003).
108 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
110 Some of the lawyers at the Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen interview on
July 16, 2003, stressed the impact of the discovery rules in eliminating the possibility
of surprise at trial, and therefore one was not giving up much by sending the oppo-
nent lawyer a complete integrated advocacy document. Interview at Sugarman, Rog-
ers, Barshak & Cohen, supra note 107.
111 For statistics on the growth of the profession from the end of World War II to
the present (approximately two hundred thousand to over one million) and on the
increased numbers of women and people of color in the profession and attending law
schools, see Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and
Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEv. L.J. 196, 207-08 (2003).
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plaintiffs lawyer wants to impress the opponent not only with the
strength of her case, but with her own ability as a lawyer. 1 2 One law-
yer told us that the detailed notebook he presents to the defense
counsel contains a carefully drafted narrative telling the story from his
client's point of view, as well as backup relevant documents relating
both to liability and damages, photographs, and expert reports. He
reports that preparing and having something like a full trial notebook
not only signals to the other side his strongest case and his readiness
for trial, but also prepares him to try the case if that becomes
necessary.11 3
Some of the lawyers we interviewed suggested that improvements
in technology had also contributed to the trend toward utilizing inte-
grated advocacy materials. With the advent of computers it is much
easier to draft and redraft a lengthy demand letter or to put together
a settlement brochure. The invention, spread and user-friendliness of
video cameras and video-editing equipment have enabled and en-
couraged more sophisticated multimedia presentations.
Moreover, a copy of such materials delivered to one's own client
permits that client to appreciate that the lawyer has fulfilled the age-
old lawyer's obligation of absorbing the client's story, applying the law
to it, and aggressively advocating an integrated narrative. Such legal
storytelling increases the sense of the disputants that they have been
treated fairly because they have been heard. 114 One lawyer, in ex-
plaining the advantage of video presentations, makes the point in a
manner that is also applicable to each of the types of integrated law/
fact methods we have described:
It can fulfill the plaintiffs need to tell his or her story without the
uncertainty of trial. Some plaintiffs are reluctant to enter into set-
tlement negotiations or accept a reasonable settlement because they
think that by settling a case they are giving up their only opportu-
nity to tell the defendant what it did wrong and how the conduct
has affected their lives. 115
112 The converse is also true: negative inferences will be drawn from a poorly
drafted letter.
113 Interview with Matthew F. Belanger, Feraci & Lange LLP, Rochester, N.Y. We
have seen one of his demand letters that was mailed in December 2003 to the oppos-
ing attorney. The letter was twelve pages of integrated narrative and a demand, and it
had six lengthy exhibits attached.
114 For a comprehensive review of the procedural justice literature that explains
the importance to clients of being heard and/or of their witnessing their own lawyer
explain their case to the opponent and/or a neutral, see Nancy A. Welsh, Making
Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
787, 820-30 (2001).
115 Turley, supra note 102, at 51.
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Many of the variables that we have linked to the proliferation of
integrated advocacy statements echo those variables that have contrib-
uted to the increased use of mediation as a means of disposing of
cases through settlement. The literature has already linked the popu-
larity of mediation to the lack of familiarity of opposing lawyers with
one another, the increased complexity of cases, the demand for ear-
lier settlement, and the lack of trial experience. 116 Mediation, itself
part of the non-formal parallel procedural universe, 1 17 typically re-
quires a written opening statement from the parties that is often an
exemplary, if shorter, form of the integrated narrative of law and fact
that we have discussed here. A lawyer-mediator with a Seattle firm has
recently described in Dispute Resolution Magazine the purpose and na-
ture of such mediation statements:
Be prepared
Given that a large percentage of mediated cases settle, prepara-
tion represents one of your best opportunities for influencing the
outcome of your client's dispute.
Almost all mediators require a memo from each side summariz-
ing the salient facts and addressing both liability and damages is-
sues. Take time to prepare a thoughtful and concise mediation
memo. While your memo should be an advocacy piece, it ought to
be more analytical than rhetorical.
Many mediators like to see a confidential submission from each
side. Your confidential letter to the mediator should candidly iden-
tify all impediments to-and motivators for-settlement. Remem-
ber that the mediator is relying on you to assist in developing a
settlement offer that realistically meets the needs of all parties.
Share your memo
Prospects for settlement are rarely advanced unless the parties
share their basic mediation memos. If there are things about the
case or the parties that you'd rather not disclose to the other side,
consider putting them in a separate confidential "mediator's-eyes-
only" memo.1 18
116 See Subrin, supra note 111, at 207-11.
117 Further, according to interviews, mediation is increasingly the only dispute res-
olution process that a dispute encounters. A putative litigation matter is often medi-
ated-successfully-before litigation is ever filed.
118 Phil Cutler, Representing Clients in Mediation: A Mediator's Perspective, Disp.
RESOL., Spring 2003, at 6, 7; see also ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE LITIGA-
TOR'S HANDBOOK 77-79 (Nancy F. Atlas et al. eds., 2000) (describing counsel's prepa-
ration for mediation); BENNETr G. PICKER, MEDIATION PRACTICE GUIDE: A HANDBOOK
FOR RESOLVING BUSINESS DISPUTES 77 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining the preparation for
mediation including the use of written submissions); J.W. ZEIGLER, JR., THE MEDIA-
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In the mediation memo, as in the sophisticated demand letter,
the lawyer tries to tell a combined law/fact story that will encourage
the mediator to view the case in a manner advantageous to the author
(and thereby be more critical of and aggressive toward the opponent).
The goal of the author "is to persuade the mediator to help convince
the other side that his or her position is fair enough to be accepted in
settlement."'19 Of course when the memo is also shared with the
other side, the audience expands to include the opposing lawyer and
her client as well as the mediator (and, in some measure, the author's
own client). Once again, the lawyer tries to select and create from the
many facts a coherent story that meshes with the applicable law in a
way that convinces others-opposing counsel, their client, a media-
tor-of the desired outcome. Depending on what a given mediation
or arbitration procedure requires, such a law/fact statement will be
drafted by each side at the beginning or during the adjudicative
process. 120
Often the substantive law also recognizes the value of an inte-
grated narrative at the outset of litigation. For example, state statu-
tory regimes protecting consumer rights often require plaintiffs to
send a demand letter prior to bringing suit for an unfair or deceptive
practice.1 2 1 The promotion of negotiation and settlement are among
the identified purposes of such a requirement. 12 2 Statutes providing a
right and outlining the procedure for filing torts claims against public
TION KIT: TOOLS TO SOLVE DISPUTES 57-59 (1997) (discussing the information that
should be provided to a mediator in dispute resolution); Stephen Patrick Doyle, Trial
Lawyers Should Add Skilled Participation In Mediation to Services They Provide to Clients, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES 209, 212 (Martha A.
Matthews ed., 1990) (discussing what information to disclose to mediators); Nicholas
J. Taldone, Winning Mediation Strategies, 22 TRIAL LAW. 190, 193 (1999) (stating that
there is an ongoing debate about how much to include in the mediation summary,
but suggesting that "parties should err on the side of full disclosure in mediation
summaries").
119 Mark Hansen, Selling Your Case a Different Way, A.B.A. J., June 2003, at 59, 61
(stating in the sidebar: "Effective Mediation Calls for Advocacy Skills, Even if They're
Not the Kind Litigators Use in Court").
120 See generally Ross B. Intelisano & Rich Intelisano, Mediation-Getting to the Negoti-
ation Table and Leaving Satisfied, 1383 PLI/CoRP. 451 (2003) (discussing the mediation
process). But this may well be closer to the requirements of complaints, a topic to
which we will later turn. See infra text accompanying notes 133-34.
121 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1782 (West 1998 & Supp. 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 93A, § 9(3) (West 1994).
122 See, e.g., Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 475 N.E.2d 727, 736 (Mass.
1985); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 852, 859 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975).
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employers often require plaintiffs to present their claims by a letter. 123
The purpose of such a document is to ensure that the public officer
receives notice of the claim so that the official can investigate whether
or not the claim is valid, and to encourage expeditious settlements
and remedial action so that similar claims will not be brought in the
future.124 Similarly, environmental statutes such as the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) require potential claimants against a fund to send a demand
letter to all potential parties. 125 Of course many other state and fed-
eral statutes require presentment or demand letters. Under the Title
VII statutory and regulatory schema, for example, a federal employee
must notify an EEO counselor of discriminatory conduct; if the matter
is not resolved, the employee may submit a formal administrative
complaint. 126
Litigators also tell us that a demand letter may, as a practical mat-
ter, be a prerequisite to filing certain substantive claims. For example,
in disability discrimination cases, transmission of a thorough narrative
of law and fact ensures that the putative defendant is aware of the
scope and necessity of an accommodation. The letter may ultimately
serve as evidence of notice in the formal universe; yet the documents
123 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 945.4 (West 1995) (setting forth the procedure
under the California Government Tort Claims Act); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 258,
§ 4 (West 1994) (setting forth the procedure under the Massachusetts Tort Claims
Act); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2000) (noting that under the Federal Tort Claims
Act "[a]n action shall not be instituted upon a claim.., unless the claimant shall have
first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency").
124 See, e.g., Yum Ku v. Town of Framingham, 762 N.E.2d 855, 858 (Mass. 2002).
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 9612 (2000).
126 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (2003) (pre-complaint processing); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.106 (individual complaints). Detailed documents are frequently required
and/desirable in order to commence claims to state commissions against discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Scott C. Moriearty et al., Drafting and Filing the Charge of Discrimination, in
REPRESENTING CLIENTS BEFORE THE MCAD IN EMPLOYMENT CASES, pt. 3, at 42 (2001).
The article suggests that plaintiffs counsel
should consider sending a demand letter to the employer before filing the
complaint with the MCAD (assuming that the six-month period is not due to
expire). Such a demand letter may include a copy of the complaint and set
out the relief that the client is seeking. Often, demand letters lead to imme-
diate settlement discussions, and it may be easier to achieve settlement
before the respondent has been publicly charged.
Id.; MASS. COMM'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, KNOW THE FACTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
THE COMPLAINT PROCESS OF THE MCAD, available at www.state.ma.us/MCAD/filing.
pdf.
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may also be drafted with hope that the dispute can be resolved infor-
mally and in its infancy. 27 In the intellectual property arena, a cease-
and-desist letter serves largely the same function. 128
Many states require that a full law/fact narrative, including ex-
pert testimony, be presented to a screening panel prior to commenc-
ing medical malpractice cases.1 29 Forcing plaintiffs to write letters to
putative defendants may become the norm of contingency fee litiga-
tion if a coordinated campaign by the advocacy group Common Good
is successful. There are now proposals pending in thirteen states to
require such letters in order for the plaintiffs lawyer to collect her
normal contingency fee. The New York Times recently summarized
the proposal:
The proposal would require the plaintiff's lawyer to send a letter to
the defendant at the start of a case, describing the injury and why
the defendant was liable for it. The defendant would not be re-
quired to make a settlement offer, and the plaintiff would not have
to accept one. But if the defendant did make an offer and the
plaintiff accepted it, his lawyer would be entitled to no more than
10 percent of the first $100,000 and 5 percent of anything more.
127 See, e.g., Hope A. Comisky, Guidelines for Successfully Engaging in the Interactive
Process to Find a Reasonable Accommodation Under the American With Disabilities Act, 13
LAB. LAW. 499, 501-09 (1998) (detailing the steps for resolving a dispute over a "rea-
sonable accommodation"); Alexandra Krueger Hedrick, Americans With Disabilities Act
Obligations and Employer Knowledge, FLA. BJ., Oct. 1996, at 73, 76 ("At an ADA trial, the
employee will need to prove that complete, preferably written, medical information
concerning the disability and the accommodation needed was provided to an individ-
ual who would ensure that it was acted upon."); Martin K. Brigham & Daniel
Bencivenga, How Do You Spell Relief?, TRLAL,June 2002, at 19, 26 (discussing the impor-
tance for an ADA plaintiff to have requested an accommodation or of the employer's
recognition of the need for it).
128 See GREGORYJ. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, LAW OF MERCHANDISE AND
CHARACTER LICENSING § 11.12, at 11-21 (2003) (discussing the role of cease-and-desist
letters as enforcement actions against infringements); RobertJossen & Louis M. Solo-
mon, Trademark, in 4 BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
§ 64.2(c), at 976-77 (Robert L. Haig ed., 1998) (describing the content and purpose
of a cease-and-desist letter); David L. Hoffman & Robert.J. Lauson, Cease-and-Desist
Letters in Intellectual Property Disputes, COMPUTER L., Dec. 1999, at 17 (explaining the
use of cease-and-desist letters in intellectual property disputes).
129 See RICHARD E. SHANDELL & ?ATRICIA SMITH, THE PREPARATION AND TRIAL OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES § 12.05, at 12-8 (rev. ed. 2001);JohnJ. Fraser, Jr., Tech-
nical Report: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 107 PEDIATRICS 602, 604
(2001) ("[A]bout half of the states have statutes establishing pretrial screening panels
that review malpractice claims and render a nonbinding advisory opinion on the mer-
its of the claim before a suit is filed.").
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If plaintiffs lawyers did not send the letter, their fees would be capped
at those levels no matter how long or hard they worked on the case.13 0
If such a proposal passes in any one state, it will be interesting to
see whether this results in perfunctory demand letters or more com-
plete advocacy documents that in fact attempt to precipitate favorable
settlements.
Let us pause now to consider the relationship, from the lawyer's
point of view, between the formal civil procedure system of formal
pleadings, discovery, and dispositive motions, and its parallel counter-
part of integrative law/fact documents and other materials that are
not covered by the procedural rules. On one hand, the effective law-
yer must adhere to rules, avoid penalties, and seek advantage for the
trial that might happen, but almost never does-a trial whose results,
if one could predict them, would influence the settlement that usually
will happen. So, for example, the complaint is drafted to have
enough in it to avoid a 12(b) (6) dismissal, to elude sanctions, to per-
mit massive discovery, to keep multiple causes of action alive, and to
avoid commitment to anything that might later embarrass the effort.
Likewise, defendants ordinarily will say as little as possible so as to
force the plaintiff to its proof on as many elements as possible, and
will state affirmative defenses only in a general way as to protect that
front. Only after these goals are met might the plaintiff entertain a
fuller integrated narrative.
On the other hand, the lawyer when acting in her parallel uni-
verse is less concerned with the prerequisites of rules or the needs of
the judge, but rather is focused on the states of mind of the opposing
lawyer and the opposing party, or a mediator, as well as the need to
inform or convince her own client. Now the purpose is to provide
information so that the other side will want to settle to the plaintiffs
benefit or, if a defendant, so that the plaintiff will be softened up for a
less expensive settlement. Some of the same incentives apply at the
discovery stage. Historically, each side wants to find out everything
relevant from the other side, but is not eager to give information
away.131 As the parallel non-formal universe becomes more explored
130 Adam Liptak, In 13 States, a Push to Limit Lawyers'Fees, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2003,
at A10. One professor thought that the proposals concentrate on the wrong party, for
defendants are the ones who need incentives to settle. "'The empirical evidence
shows that plaintiffs' lawyers are settlement-crazy,' Professor [Charles M.] Silver [a law
professor the University of Texas in Austin] said 'It's not on the plaintiffs side that we
need to create incentives to settle.'" Id.
131 See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its
Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 789 (recounting interviews
with lawyers about the state of the discovery system); Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the
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by the practicing bar and the academy these traditional patterns may
be transformed.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS
The practical desire to convey an integrated narrative of law and
fact creates tension for lawyers operating within the formal system.
The existence of a robust parallel non-formal procedural universe
presently mitigates that tension, but there remain intriguing questions
about the future of the practice and teaching of law. 132 For instance,
will the pleadings and motions filed by lawyers in the formal system
increasingly resemble the advocacy statements exchanged in the non-
formal system? Will discovery practices continue as in the past?
Should the procedural rules of the formal system be amended to
model the non-formal system? And what, if anything, should Profes-
sor Shapiro and other civil procedure professors be teaching students
about this emerging parallel procedural universe?
As the practicing bar adjusts to the reality that trial is a "patholog-
ical" event that is unlikely to occur,1 33 the strategy of pleading, discov-
ery and motions in the formal system may change. At the pleading
stage, for example, counsel may be more willing to introduce advo-
cacy into their formal pleadings. Much of the literature on com-
plaints, particularly when written for practicing lawyers, emphasizes
the need to consider audience, including the judges, opposing law-
yers, and the press, all of whom will often get their first, or most im-
portant, initial impression of the case through this document.134
Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lauyers About the System, of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 217 (same).
132 One question that elicited interesting responses was: "Think of a recent or
pending case and tell me what document(s) in that case file would most likely bring
another lawyer in your office up-to-speed in a case were they to get involved at some
midpoint?" Although the answer always begin with "It depends," the answer was never
a formal pleading, but rather a mediation statement, an internal memorandum, a
letter to the client, or a demand letter.
133 SeeJudith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211, 261 (1995) (referring to the inci-
dence of trial as a "pathological" event, saying that the description came from minutes
of a meeting of the Federal Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure).
134 See CIVIL TRIL PRAcTICE DESxBOOK 92-93 (Robert A. Robbins et al. eds.,
1997);Jan Armon, How to Write a Factual Complaint, 46 PLI/NY 7 (1999); Herbert A.
Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J.
763, 768-72 (1995); Bill Brystrynski, Drafting Complaints, N.C. ACAD. TRIAL LAW.: TRIAL
BRIEFS MAG., Apr. 1999, at 6, available at 1999 WL 33504653; George G. Mahfood,
Crafting Persuasive Complaints, TRIAL, Dec. 1992, at 39.
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Here is typical advice, taken from a 1995 article in the Illinois Bar
Journal:
An effectively drafted complaint does more than merely place the
defendant on notice of a pending action. It identifies the legal is-
sues for the court, clarifies the facts and law for the plaintiff and his
or her attorney, and may even encourage the defendant to come
forward with a settlement offer.' 3 5
In other words, the typical complaint might someday evolve to-
ward something reminiscent of a demand letter. We know from our
interviews of one practice that is increasingly common: plaintiffs are
attaching a copy of their demand letter to the defendants as an ex-
hibit to their complaint. This practice-as well as its counterpart, at-
taching the complaint to the demand letter-demonstrates well the
interplay of the formal and non-formal systems.' 3 6
Defendants, too, might benefit from an integrated narrative. Al-
though the pleading rules do not contemplate a narrative, some de-
fense lawyers have successfully introduced them nonetheless. Some
lawyers begin their answers with numbered affirmative defenses.
These "affirmative defenses" are not affirmative defenses within the
meaning of Federal Rule 8(c), 137 but are integrated narratives of law
and fact that tell the defendant's story. 13 Further, like their counter-
parts, defendants' counsel have been known to attach responses that
they have previously sent in response to demand letters.
135 David E. Sorkin, Not the Same Old Complaint, ILL. B.J., Apr. 1995, at 201, 202
(1995).
136 In other instances, of course, the demand letter is sent separately and then
later becomes the first draft of the complaint. Interestingly, however, we understand
that the complaint is often less factually specific and thus a narrative of law and fact
that is inferior to the demand letter. Indeed, one young associate with whom we
spoke described a recent assignment where they had been told to convert the demand
letter into a complaint; and what this meant, in fact, was to strip the demand letter of
many of the particulars.
137 See FED. R. Cix. P. 8(c):
[A] party shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy,
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow
servant, laches, license, payment, release, resjudicata, statute of frauds, stat-
ute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense.
138 The popularity of this practice may be spreading, but its roots run rather deep.
For example, Thom was taught the effectiveness of this practice from the most ad-
mired practitioner with whom he ever practiced; and this most esteemed lawyer had
been doing that for decades.
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Discovery strategy may also evolve. The conventional wisdom that
sophisticated parties want to "discover everything and disclose noth-
ing" assumes that a trial is a realistic possibility. But spending the
money and time to discover everything makes little sense in the typical
case where the ultimate goal is to come up with a focused integrated
statement on only the most important aspects of the case. The poten-
tial for increasingly early settlements with only the minimum discovery
necessary to make an intelligent determination of value leads one to
engage in less discovery, not more.139
Parties may also be less resistant to disclosure. A plaintiff's law-
yer, for example, may very much want her client to be deposed so that
the opposing side knows her story; if a trial is unlikely ever to occur,
there is less reason to withhold testimony. Nor is there as compelling
a reason for defendant's counsel to withhold the clever cross-examina-
tion; any tricks or surprises reserved for trial will rarely be used. The
Director of the Bartlit Center for Trial Strategy at the Northwestern
University School of Law penned this suggestive title in a 2003 issue of
Litigation, the journal published by the Litigation Section of the Amer-
ican Bar Association: Showing Your Hand: A Counter-Intuitive Strategy for
Deposition Defense. 140
The informal universe may be sufficiently mature and appealing
to ask whether some elements of it should be incorporated into the
formal system of procedure. In David's article on Rule 16, he com-
pared the development of the practice and rulemaking on case man-
agement to what Lon Fuller had heard about the construction of a
path in Cambridge Common. 41 The workmen were evidently told to
construct a formal path by pouring the cement where the pedestrians
had already trampled an informal path. 142 However, because we are
wary of paving an entire universe, both formal and informal, we distin-
guish that metaphor and search for alternate authority in the corpus
139 SeeJoyce S. Meyers, Focusing: When Less is More, LITIGATION, Winter 2002, at 6,
10-12.
140 Steven Lubet, Showing Your Hand: A Counter-Intuitive Strategy for Deposition De-
fense, LITIGATION, Winter 2003, at 38, adapted from Steven Lubet, Rethinking Deposition
Defense: The Case for Strategic Disclosure, 26 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 13 (2002). Lubet's
article in Litigation was discussed recently by Judge Mark A. Drummond in his article
Rethinking Deposition Defense Strategy: Author Challenges Traditional Wisdom of Instructing
Clients Not to Elaborate, LITIG. NEws, Nov. 2003, at 5. Drummond's article ends: "'For
years, the conventional wisdom has been that clients should not volunteer informa-
tion in a deposition. But today, with so few cases going to trial, we need to rethink
this approach,' says Linda L. Listrom, Chicago, Co-Chair of the Section's Trial Prac-
tice Committee." Id.
141 See Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1992.
142 See id.
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of David's work. To that end, we have considered his insights on
whether discretionary standards or more rigid rules offer a more ef-
fective solution to problems; 143 and we have studied his article about
the virtues of individual choice and antipaternalism. 144 Our conclu-
sion, although tentative, is to permit the parallel, informal universe of
advocacy materials to develop unimpeded by additional procedural
rules.
First, as a general proposition, commons in urban areas are more
in need of grass and flowers than more cement.1 45 The revision pro-
cess tends to lengthen and complicate rules and, of course, the norms
of advocacy will ultimately test the boundaries of rigid rules.1 4 6 If we
are right, the lawyers, largely on their own, usually without a rule, and
without a standard, seem to be fulfilling the need to integrate law and
fact into an advocacy narrative, and to share it with the opposition,
their own clients, and when desirable, with mediators. Because our
society relies more heavily than most on private litigation to enforce
safety and social norms, we are very hesitant to suggest any procedural
hurdles that might, in turn, have significant negative substantive con-
sequences on plaintiffs' meritorious claims. 147 The imposition of a
burden, such as a mandate that prior to discovery a demand letter
contain a threshold quantum of specificity, could be dispositive of
some worthy claims and have a chilling effect on still others.
We note, however, that the esteemed Lord Woolf in his reform of
English practice does have a rule for a written protocol to be ex-
changed between potential litigants before a lawsuit is ever com-
menced. 14s His reasons sound like the reasons that we have suggested
143 See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 913, 945-46 (1998).
144 See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REv. 519,
521, 567-68, 571 (1988).
145 The shelf life of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is in sharp decline. Enacted
in 1938, the Federal Rules were substantially amended in 1948, 1961, 1963, 1966,
1970, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1991, 1993, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. Most of the Federal
Rules have been amended at least three times. Only ten of the original Federal Rules
have never been amended. See Main, supra note 96, at 391 (describing the "prolifera-
tion of amendments to the Federal Rules").
146 See Main, supra note 30, at 479-86 (noting that [t]he number of amendments
to the Federal Rules is striking and is increasing").
147 For a discussion of the role of civil litigation in the United States' enforcement
of safety and social norms, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., From Whom No Secrets Are Hid,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1665, 1692-93 (1998); and Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Dis-
covery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a New World Order , 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
153, 188-96 (1999).
148 LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE-FINAL REPORT: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD
CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES § 3, ch. 10, at
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for why American lawyers are operating in that parallel universe. He
suggests that litigation has become so expensive and intrusive that get-
ting potential litigants to tell their stories in advance makes sense, be-
cause most cases settle anyway-as they should-and this will help
many of them settle earlier and with more information. 149 As previ-
ously suggested, our country relies on private litigation to enforce
public law in ways distinguishable from other countries. And early
requirements for specificity can have untoward substantive conse-
quences. Moreover, as Senator Thomas Walsh observed in the 1920s,
the restrained practices of the English bar and the culture of English
litigation account for a certain lack of aggressiveness that is distin-
guishable from our own experience. 150 Perhaps the English bar has
become more adversarial and the American bar less, but we would not
bet on the latter. Our lawyers are likely to vigorously test and contest
any requirement.
American lawyers are finding intelligent and useful ways to con-
vey their positions to the relevant audiences. Cases are settling, al-
though we know almost nothing empirically about why, when, how
often, and on what terms they are settling. Yet at this point, particu-
larly given the dearth of relevant factual information, we would leave
the informal parallel procedural universe alone.1 5 '
The informal universe may have implications for the formal pro-
cedure. We-and David-have argued previously that adding litiga-
tion steps for all cases in a trans-substantive way may cause a good deal
of additional time and expense for the bulk of cases that do not need
those levels of activity and will settle anyway. 152 Steve has argued that
107-11 (1996), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/sec3a.htm#cl0; seeJa-
son Curriden, Woolf Reforms Target Inefficiency and Inequity in UK Court System, INSIDE
LITIG., July 1999, at 3 (noting the impact of the new rule requiring a Letter of Proto-
col to be mailed by the claimant's lawyer to defendant before the filing of the writ);
Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1564-65
n.17 (2003) (discussing Lord Woolf's report as devoting a "substantive section to case
management").
149 Curriden, supra note 148, at 1, 2, 4.
150 Letter from Thomas Walsh, to Mr. and Mrs. Hutches (Oct. 5, 1925) (on file
with authors).
151 See generally Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in
Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002) (describing the role of empiri-
cal research in civil rulemaking); Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change:
Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221 (1997) (reflecting on the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 by focusing on the actors and processes involved in the concep-
tion of the Act).
152 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1995; Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedu-
ral Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49
ALA. L. REV. 79, 93-94 (1997).
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a firm trial date, seriously enforced, with discovery supervision by the
court in the larger cases, is as much case management as is usually
required to have an efficient, fair civil litigation system. 153 And Thom
has argued for more judicial discretion in areas where more rigid pro-
cedural rules may create needless mischief.154 Perhaps the realization
of this parallel informal procedural universe in which lawyers are find-
ing ways to focus and argue their legal and factual positions to each
other will invite the judiciary and bar to reconsider all the formal pro-
cedure that has been created. Are mandatory disclosure and the se-
ries of discovery, scheduling, and pretrial conferences, and the
accompanying burgeoning amounts of paperwork, really necessary or
helpful for all but the largest, most discovery-laden cases?
It is difficult to imagine how the informal system could operate
on its own, rather than as a complement. 155 The threat of remaining
in the formal universe must play a significant part in advancing the
development of the case within the parallel informal system. This ob-
servation, in turn, leads to the question of how one simultaneously
provides an early integrated narrative, advertising the desire to settle,
while at the same time backing it up with the clout that comes from
the realistic ability to try a winning case. This issue becomes particu-
larly thorny in a world where fewer lawyers have trial experience or a
reputation for being effective trial lawyers. What does this dual uni-
verse mean for those clients who cannot afford lawyers in firms with
deep trial experience or lawyers who are equipped to go the whole
distance? Consequently, for those clients and their lawyers, the
threats implied in the formal universe, with the possibility of trial,
have little or no meaning.
Consider, for example, the plight of the overwhelmed legal ser-
vice office with ever-decreasing funding trying to zealously represent
its impoverished clients in cases involving benefits, discrimination, or
consumer protection. For that matter, similar constraints, although
not always monetary ones, apply to any firm that lacks lawyers with real
153 Subrin, supra note 85, at 45-46; Subrin, supra note 152, at 93-94.
154 Main, supra note 30.
155 Professor Burbank reminds us of the relevance of Steve Subrin's favorite quote.
Professor Maitland warned that "[e]quity was not a self-sufficient system, at every
point, it presupposed the existence of common law.... [I]f the legislature said, 'Com-
mon Law is hereby abolished,' this decree if obeyed would have meant anarchy....
Equity without common law would have been a castle in the air, an impossibility."
F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FoRms OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, Two COURSES OF
LECTURES 19 (A. Chaytor & W. Whittaker eds., 1920). In a similar manner, the paral-
lel procedural universe that is the topic of this Article requires a robust formal civil
trial system and the realistic threat of real trials.
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trial experience. Perhaps underfunded or inadequately staffed of-
fices, in terms of trial experience, should recognize (as they probably
do already) that in the typical case most lawyers will largely occupy the
formal universe, but at a minimal level of required activity, trying to
quickly get into the parallel universe with plausible early integrated
documents. Most of these cases will settle or be disposed of by mo-
tion. But these lawyers could, we suggest, be backed up with a few
lawyers known in the community to relish solely the formal universe,
and who like nothing more than trying cases, and, in fact, have exten-
sive experience in so doing. Consequently, the other non-trial lawyers
would have available the threat of transferring their cases to their trial-
experienced colleagues. We know that in some firms such arrange-
ments already exist, and that small "boutique" firms and individuals
have emerged who, for the most part, only try cases or handle appeals.
Recognition of the parallel universe presents engaging opportu-
nities for law professors, as well as lawyers, even though at this point
we know little about that universe, and can only surmise what seems to
be going on. In a sense (forgive us for sounding a bit lofty here) we in
this Article have been like theoretical physicists trying to perceive a
reality that we infer must be there. It will take empiricists to discover
its contours. This presents real problems. Demand letters and re-
sponses thereto, and settlement brochures and videos, are not public
documents. They are not filed in court, and lawyers may not be eager
to divulge them for research purposes. Mediations are normally pri-
vate and confidential, and so access to mediation statements will not
come easily.
The difficulty and complexity of empirical research into the par-
allel universe may be even more daunting than we have so far sug-
gested. From what we can glean from talking with lawyers, the
documents they exchange, including demand letters and responses
thereto, seem to vary by the substance of the litigation. Discrimina-
tion lawyers, personal injury lawyers, and commercial lawyers probably
put different types of things in their advocacy materials. The rhythms
of these cases may vary by substantive area. The integrated law/fact
documents do not appear in judicial opinions nor do they show up
very often, as yet, in form books. Like black holes, this alternative
universe may remain unseen and uncharted, but inferred for our life-
time and beyond.156
156 There are some possibilities for meaningful empirical exploration of the alter-
native procedural universe. One empiricist friend has given us two ideas: (1) See if an
insurance company will permit a comparison of its litigation files now and ten years
ago; perhaps this will show the extent that integrated narrative documents were sup-
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The parallel universe prompts a number of evidentiary and ethi-
cal issues. Some of these have already been faced in the mediation
world. There are statutes and mediation practices that treat anything
said or written for a mediation as confidential. 157 But what about
these extensive integrated demand letters, brochures, and videos that
are increasingly being used? Are they part of inadmissible settlement
negotiations under the Federal Rules of Evidence? 158 How much
"puffery" will be permitted before it becomes a violation of the law-
yer's obligations under the applicable Rules of Professional Responsi-
bility?15 9 Will it be fraud to say things in a demand letter for which
the writer does not have evidence? If the opposing side relies on that
fraud in reaching settlement, will the fraud upset the finality of settle-
ment?160 If a demand letter is sent after the commencement of suit, is
it subject to Rule 11? Could a demand letter affect the removability of
a case? 16' One topic that has begun to be debated in the scholarly
plied previously and now. One could examine, for instance, whether demand letters
have become more detailed and longer; and (2) Send a short survey to both plaintiff
and defendant lawyers asking about their and their opponents' use of integrated doc-
uments, videos, and mediation statements. Although looking at what is actually done
is normally more reliable, this may not be an area of inquiry in which lawyers are apt
to distort reality in their answers. One judge suggested that we could inquire at meet-
ings of litigation sections of bar associations.
157 See generally Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality:
Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 79 (2001) (arguing for
uniformity); Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 20HIo ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 1 (1986) (arguing against a blanket mediation privilege); Michael L.
Prigoff, Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation, 12 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 1 (1988) (discussing protection of confidentiality).
158 See FED. R. EvID. 408 (compromise and offers to compromise); see Wayne D.
Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (1988)
(examining ways to enhance the protection of settlement communications); Charles
W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of Mediation Proceedings
in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REv. 91 (1999) (examining the protection for confidential
communications in the context of mediation).
159 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2004); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITv DR 1-102(A) (4) (1980). See generally Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tel-
lam, The Dishonesty Rule-A Rule With a Future, 74 OR. L. REv. 665 (1995) (discussing
the application of the dishonesty rule).
160 One case of interest is Slotkin v. Citizens Cas. Co. of New York, 614 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1979), in which a split appellate court held that plaintiffs could maintain their
action for fraud based on defendant's counsel's misrepresentation of the amount of
insurance coverage without first rescinding the settlement. Id. at 318. A recent En-
glish article explores "how the law should treat a plea of mistake made by a party to a
settlement of a disputed or disputable claim." N.H. Andrews, Mistaken Settlements of
Disputable Claims, 1989 LLOYD'S MAR. & COMM. L.Q. 431.
161 See Elizabeth P. Allen, The 30-Day Removal Time Limit, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2001, at 20
(detailing the removal process).
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literature is whether negotiation itself should be subject to more regu-
lation, or rather be left to the self-regulation that comes from attor-
neys needing to build up trust in their community of lawyers with
whom they contend-trust that will be depleted if they are found to
be dishonest. 162
We, the authors, teach civil procedure. So, too, does David Sha-
piro. To what extent has our growing realization that we are living in
a world of settlement largely without trials influenced the nature of
our civil procedure courses? Until recently, neither of the authors
had ever mentioned the parallel procedure to our students. And yet
the demand letter and response to it may well turn out to be the most
influential civil litigation documents that they draft. If we are right,
the lawyer of the future will continue to search for opportunities to
advocate in writing or orally with an integrated law/fact narrative sub-
mitted to the opponent, and in many cases a somewhat different ren-
dition for a third-party mediator. And all of this is done while still
being conversant and strategically aware of the formal system. With-
out the formal system and the threat of trial, the parallel universe
would usually collapse. We have just added demand letter-writing and
mediation statement exercises into the second edition of our
casebook, to accompany the many exercises centered on the tradi-
tional, formal, rule-bound system. 163
Current legal education has courses in evidence, trial practice,
legal practice, alternative dispute resolution, and negotiation. We sus-
pect that these courses also fail to deal with those written integra-
tive narrative statements that lawyers have long since invented to
influence their settlements. Our initial predilection is that rhetoric
is the common theme that runs through the parallel universe,
and to some extent, is largely influential in the formal universe.
Maybe the Greeks had it right. 164 Perhaps rhetoric should be an es-
162 See, e.g., Paul Rosenberger, Laissez-"Fair" An Argument for the Status Quo Ethical
Constraints on Lauyers as Negotiators, 13 OHIO ST.J. ON Dlsp. RESOL. 611 (1998); Gerald
T. Husch & James L. Martin, Ethics in Settlement Negotiations: Is There Such a Thing?,
ADVOCATE (Idaho), June 2003, at 24.
163 See STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS 0.
MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 202-03, 533-34 (2d ed.
2004).
164 See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Friedrich Solmsen ed.,
1984). See generally THOMAS M. CONLEY, RHETORIC IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION 1-72
(1990) (discussing the important role of rhetoric in Greece); THE RHETORICAL TRADI-
TION: READINGS FROM CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (Patricia Bizzell & Bruce Herz-
berg eds., 1990) (compiling a canon of recognized authors and works in the
rhetorical tradition).
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sential part of a good liberal education, a law school education, or
both. 1
65
Perhaps the most interesting question that the academy, judges,
and lawyers may wish to consider concerning the parallel procedural
universe of non-rule mandated integrated law/fact narratives is
whether this development we have described is a good thing. Is it a
good thing in the sense that it makes for a better civil litigation pro-
cess than in its absence? Our answer is "yes." For us, law is a means
whereby societies attempt to replace the law of nature with norms de-
cided upon by the society itself in an attempt to make life less harsh
and more predictable. A good civil litigation system, among other
goals, tries to have the law applied as predictably as it can, given all of
the uncertainties of law and fact and other constraints which arise
from competing values, such as the protection of confidential commu-
nications and the desire to have lay jury participation in the pro-
cess. 166 Moreover, such a system seeks to obtain the peaceful
resolution of disputes and the acceptance of judicial decisions, result-
ing from the justifiable belief of the parties and the public that the
system is legitimate and fair. In a litigation system in which so many of
the cases are disposed of through settlement, it is salutary, it seems to
us, that the lawyers have found ways, absent trial, to present their cli-
ents' positions in the strongest light. That this is done through narra-
tives that show how the law should be applied to the particular facts is
precisely what one would hope happens in order to achieve the goals
for a legal system that we have described.
We, along with many others, regret the phenomenon of the van-
ishing trial. 167 We have written at length about the positive aspects of
165 See generally Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage,
8 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 613 (1999) (examining the history of legal rhetoric); Bruce
McLeod, Rules and Rhetoric, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 305, 308 (1985) (arguing "that the
role of rules in judicial decision-making is commonly misunderstood"); Kristen K.
Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27 VT.
L. REv. 483 (2003) (discussing the historic use of rhetoric in the profession of law);
Kurt M. Saunders, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Argument, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 566, 566
(1994) (examining "the practical nature and justificatory function of legal
argument").
166 Civil litigation systems have many underlying values, some of them at war with
each other. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country's
Civil Procedure, 7 TUL.J. INT'L& COMP. L. 139, 140 (1999) (listing "different values and
goals" in the U.S. procedural system).
167 Judges, lawyers, and scholars recently discussed and regretted the vanishing
trial at a conference in San Francisco, as reported in the New York Times. See Liptak,
supra note 94. See also Miller, supra note 87 (arguing that courts have placed such
high a value on efficiency that they risk eclipsing the rights of litigants to have their
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the public trials of citizen disputes, and the critical part played by the
formal litigation system, especially jury trials, in our democracy. 168 We
also regret what appears to be the gradual loss of a bar experienced in
oral, public advocacy, and the trial of cases in open court. After all,
isn't the art of advocacy what lured (and lures) many to this profes-
sion in the first place? 169 We have also included in both editions of
our casebook an exercise inviting students to make a closing argu-
ment to a jury in their first-year civil procedure class. 170
There is, though, no evidence that the integrated advocacy
materials we have explored and applauded have produced more set-
tlements than occurred previously, nor that the cases that have settled
using such materials would have otherwise ended up in trial. Moreo-
ver, perhaps we are gaining a litigation bar trained in skills equally
important to those involved in the trial of cases, such as how to write
law/fact narratives in a clear, convincing manner and how to settle
cases at an earlier time than was the previous norm, with settlements
that truly reflect the realistic strengths and weaknesses of each posi-
tion. We hope that our empiricist colleagues can, over time, figure
our whether the gains, and potential losses, are in fact happening.
The pragmatic responses of the American litigation bar in the
parallel procedural universe should, we contend, encourage each seg-
ment of our legal profession-judges, lawyers, law professors, and em-
piricists-to reassess and recalibrate their views of civil litigation,
procedure, advocacy, and curriculum.
day in court); Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A.J., Oct. 2002, at 24, 27
(emphasizing push toward ADR); Stephanie Francis Ward, "Vanishing Trials" Issue
Won't Go Away, A.B.A. J. E-REP., Dec. 19, 2003 (discussing San Francisco symposium
sponsored by the ABA's Litigation Section and its Vanishing Trials Project).
168 See, e.g., SUBRIN, MINOW, BRODIN & MAIN, supra note 163, at 375-90; Subrin,
supra note 111, at 197-98.
169 For an impassioned defense of our professional calling, see LLOYD PAUL
STRYKER, THE ART OF ADvocACY (1954).
170 See SUBRIN, MINOW, BRODIN & MAIN, supra note 163; see also STEPHEN N. SUBRIN,
MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS 0. MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE,
PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 552-53 (1st ed. 2000) (recounting this exercise). Query
when these students will again give a closing argument to a jury. But we think that
having students give simulated closing arguments is an excellent way to demonstrate
the importance of facts and how persuasive narratives of law and fact are constructed.
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